


## Now available: “The United States Army in the Iraq War, 2003-2011”

By Public Affairs Office 17 January 2019



*The USAWC Press published, Jan. 17, 2019, “The United States Army in the Iraq War, 2003-2011” researched and written by Army officers Col. Joel Rayburn, Col. Frank Sobchak, Lt. Col. Jeanne F. Godfroy, Col. Matthew D. Morton, Col. James S. Powell, and*

“The United States Army in the Iraq War, 2003-2011” has been published by the U.S. Army War College Press. The two-volume set (2003 - 2006 and 2006 - 2011) is published in a searchable digital format to facilitate further study at the web site, [publications.armywarcollege.edu](http://publications.armywarcollege.edu)

The study was researched and written by Army officers Col. Joel Rayburn, Col. Frank Sobchak, Lt. Col. Jeanne F. Godfroy, Col. Matthew D. Morton, Col. James S. Powell, and Lt. Col. Matthew M. Zais.

The study includes a foreword by Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Mark A. Milley.

“We have a professional and moral responsibility to learn the relevant

lessons of the recent past. OIF is a sober reminder that technological advantages and standoff weapons alone cannot render a decision; that the promise of short wars is often elusive; that the ends, ways, and means must be in balance; that our Army must understand the type of war we are engaged with in order to adapt as necessary; that decisions in war occur on the ground in the mud and dirt; and that timeless factors such as human agency, change, and an enemy's conviction, all shape a war's outcome," wrote Milley.

As Chief of Staff of the Army in July 2013, Gen. Raymond T. Odierno commissioned the study to capture key lessons, insights and innovations from more than eight years of conflict in Iraq.

This study is "the astonishing story of an Army that reached within itself to learn and adapt in the midst of a war the United States was well on its way to losing," wrote Odierno in a foreword. "It was a formative experience for a general of Soldiers and leaders ... a field of sacrifice for many thousands of our fellow countrymen.

"Above all, these volumes are meant to ensure their sacrifices are never forgotten."

The authors were charged to examine from both the U.S. and enemy perspective the operational level of war – the level of war, command and intelligence that bridges the strategic and tactical levels. "Given the operational level focus of the study, our attention primarily settled on the corps and theater level commanders whose responsibility fell in creating campaign plans that translated strategic political guidance into tactical direction and that blended the various elements of national power toward a strategic goal," according to editors Rayburn and Sobchak, in the Executive Summary.

Published by the U.S. Army War College's publishing arm, the two-volume set is expected to encourage and enable further studies on other levels and aspects of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This study and its primary sources will be reviewed and reassessed by others as a way to continue to improve as a profession.

Many of the references used by the authors are available, to include now-declassified materials, at the website of the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center at [ahec.armywarcollege.edu](http://ahec.armywarcollege.edu); scroll to 'CENTCOM IRAQ PAPERS' on the rotating display.

U.S. Army War College News Archives