This document contains educational material designed to promote discussion by students of the U.S. Army War College. It does not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Army.
THEORY OF WAR AND STRATEGY

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A. COURSE OVERVIEW.

A.1. GENERAL. This course, which is the bedrock of the U.S. Army War College curriculum, introduces students to the theory of war and strategy. The military officer or national security professional must be well grounded in both the theory of war and the theory of strategy to be effective at the higher levels of the national security hierarchy. Theory, defined as a body of ideas and principles, provides a basis for the study of a particular subject and offers a framework within which professional discussions can occur. Theory generates and defines the common language that facilitates communication. It provides ways to think about issues. Theory also may provide advice on solving problems. Good theory, however, is not dogmatic—it allows, even encourages, debate. When theory no longer seems to explain or fit the situation, new theory emerges to supplement or replace the old. Theory is essential to comprehension, and is the basis of the sound thinking that wins wars. In essence, this course prepares students to think critically about war strategy, and the uses of military force and forces.

A.2. PURPOSE. The course purpose is two-fold:

A.2.a. To produce senior officers and leaders who understand the theory and nature of war and conflict, and who can evaluate the relationships between warfare and the contemporary strategic environment.

A.2.b. To produce senior officers and leaders conversant in strategic theory.

A.3. OUTCOMES. At the end of the course, the student should have developed a solid understanding of the theory of war and strategy that synthesizes past theory and practice with personal experience and ideas for the future. Specifically, students should be able to:

A.3.a. Analyze the theory of war, to include its enduring nature and its evolving character and conduct.

A.3.b. Analyze the theory and nature of strategy.

A.3.c. Apply the theories of war and strategy to the formulation and implementation of strategy in the contemporary international security environment.

A.4. FOCUS QUESTIONS.

A.4.a. The course will assist the student in thinking about several broad questions.

A.4.a.1. What is war? What are the differences between the enduring nature of war versus the character of a particular conflict?
A.4.a.2. Why do wars occur? Why do states decide to use force? What characteristics of the international system are important considerations for strategists?

A.4.a.3. What is strategy? How does one think about and evaluate a strategy?

A.4.a.4. How do states and non-state actors fight wars? What constraints or limits are imposed on the conduct of war? What influences tend to expand war?

A.4.a.5. How do wars end? What constitutes winning and how does one know when victory is achieved?

A.4.a.6. How will an understanding of strategy contribute to the conduct of war in the future?

A.4.b. When examining specific theories or theorists and strategies or strategists, one might find it helpful to consider the following:

A.4.b.1. How does the theorist or strategist define war? (What is war?)

A.4.b.2. Why does the theorist or strategist believe wars should be fought? (Why do wars occur? What is the object of war?)

A.4.b.3. How does the theorist or strategist believe wars should be fought? (e.g., offense vs. defense, annihilation vs. attrition, long vs. short wars, in what domains, etc.?)

A.4.b.4. How does the theorist or strategist believe wars are won? (What constitutes victory and how is it achieved?)

A.4.b.5. What concepts of enduring relevance does the theorist or strategist provide? How do those concepts influence contemporary strategic thinking?

A.4.b.6. When examining each of these issues. Consider the tensions between continuity and change. In other words, what is truly new versus simply unfamiliar?

A.5. SCOPE.


A.5.a.1. Figure 1 offers a simple way to think about strategy. Both this course and the National Security Policy and Strategy course use this construct.
A.5.a.2. Strategy is the alignment of ends (aims, objectives), ways (concepts), and means (resources)—informed by risk—to attain goals. The depiction of the three-legged stool is a simple technique to portray that relationship. If the ends, ways, and means are in acceptable proportion (assuming that the legs of the stool are well aligned), the strategy probably is sound. However, such an alignment is an ideal state that rarely, if ever, occurs. In reality, because of the dynamic nature of the international system, strategists must continually search for methods to achieve a better alignment among the three elements.

A.5.a.3. To help in this search, strategists can evaluate the relationship of ends, ways, and means by testing the suitability, acceptability, feasibility, and risk (the “SAF-R Test”) of the strategy. In testing suitability, strategists must assess whether the strategy actually will achieve or make significant contributions to the accomplishment of the desired end. Acceptability primarily concerns the ways of the strategy. Is the strategy acceptable, and to whom? In other words, are the concepts appropriate? Do the ways have support from key domestic constituencies and governing bodies? Are they legal? Ethical? Is the end worth the cost? Will allies or coalition partners agree? Finally, is the strategy feasible? Feasibility primarily concerns means or resources. In short, do means exist or are means reasonably attainable to execute the ways within the time contemplated for the strategy? A strategy that fails any one of those tests is unsound, and requires reconsideration. Most importantly, a strategy that fails to meet the test of suitability may require a reevaluation of the policy objective (end) sought.

A.5.a.4. Because the international security environment is always undergoing change, the identification and testing of the ends, ways, and means of the strategy is an iterative process. Strategists must ensure that they re-examine all elements of the strategy and reassess them on a recurring basis.

A.5.a.5. All strategies, both in their formulation and implementation, hold some degree of risk that strategists must assess. Unfortunately, there is no set, objective formula or process for assessing risk. Each case will be different and the risk involved will depend significantly on the overall context from which the strategy emerges. Nonetheless, strategists can examine risk from three closely interrelated perspectives: intrinsic, external, and implementation.
A.5.a.5.a. Before turning to an explanation of each of those perspectives, the issue of their complex interrelationships bears some emphasis. While we divide risk into three separate categories for ease of explanation, it is imperative to understand that there are no bright, clear lines separating these three perspectives. In reality, these three elements are inextricably linked. During strategy formulation, for example, the intrinsic and external perspectives continuously influence each other. In a similar fashion, during strategy implementation, the actors that influence external risk and the factors that contribute to implementation risk closely interact. These interactions then oftentimes compel changes in the ends, ways, and means of the intrinsic strategy construct. Thus, while we address these perspectives separately, the strategist must view their complex interactions holistically. Moreover, any assessment or reassessment of risk must consider these interactions.

A.5.a.5.b. Intrinsic risk concerns the relationship between the ends, ways, and means. If the objective (end) is too big for the resources allocated, or the ways under consideration are inappropriate for the means or ends, or that the concept (way) envisioned is too grandiose for the available means and ends – then the strategist has identified internal risk within the strategy. (See Figure 2.) In examining the intrinsic dimension of the strategy, strategists might consider key questions such as, What value-based judgments were made in developing this strategy, particularly ends? What assumptions were made about acceptable ways and availability of means? Are those assumptions explicitly stated for the decision-maker? What circumstances or developments might change those assumptions during strategy development?

A.5.a.5.c. External risk concerns all of the actors (domestic and international) that can influence the development or implementation of the strategy. Domestic actors might include, for example, legislative bodies, other departments of government, public opinion, interest groups, or the media. International actors or influences could include: allies or coalition partners, international organizations, international law, non-
state actors, or economic conditions. In this case, strategists should ask, is the end worth the cost? Is the strategy acceptable to external actors? If not, which ones and why? How might the strategy accommodate their objections? If objections cannot be met, how to mitigate consequences within the strategy?

A.5.a.5.d. Implementation risk is similarly complex. Implementation also is where Clausewitz’s famous observations about the fog of war and friction most readily come into play. What could go wrong? What might derail the proposed strategy? How might the object of the strategy likely react? What are the potential negative consequences of executing the strategy as designed? If this strategy fails in implementation, how will we recover from that consequence or outcome? Are there mechanisms in place to capture assessments of implementation success or failure? How will we know that the strategy is no longer suitable, acceptable, or feasible, and under what conditions?

A.5.a.6. Ignoring risk is foolhardy. Once having identified and examined these three elements of risk, the strategist must address how to deal effectively with them. The strategist either must adjust the ends, ways, or means to realign the strategy; take steps to ameliorate the risk; or, having recognized the risk, determine if it is acceptable. In performing such analysis, strategists should ask questions such as: What is the specific risk? Is it intrinsic, external, or implementation? Who actually assumes the risk? Is the risk time limited? Can the risks be mitigated? If so, how and by whom? If the risk cannot be mitigated, is the risk acceptable, and to whom?

A.5.a.7. Because of the dynamic nature of the international security environment and the iterative nature of strategy, strategists also must routinely reassess risk.

A.5.a.8. One final note of importance concerning the USAWC strategy construct. The terms, ends, ways, means, and risk are not universally agreed—either within the national security or academic communities. Other organizations, experts, authors, and theories that you will read may use these terms differently. In your readings and seminar dialogue, you must be aware of the differences in usage and translate them into the USAWC vernacular when necessary.

A.5.b. Course Organization. Two blocks constitute the course. The blocks and their constituent lessons are sequential and build on previous material.

A.5.b.1. Block I: “Foundations of Theory, War, and Strategy” begins by building on the use of history as a tool for the strategist presented in the Introduction to Strategic Studies course. Using Thucydides’ The Peloponnesian War as a vehicle, the course initially examines basic concepts related to theory, war, policy, and strategy that are essential for students to understand. The block then surveys concepts of international relations theory (such as realism, liberalism, and constructivism), and geopolitics as a way of understanding why and how wars occur. In addition, this block considers the nature and character of war through the theoretical lens of the great Prussian philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz. The block also reviews a broader range of
causes of war. At the end of this block, the student should be able to explain the nature versus character of war, the basics of strategic theory, the uses of history, essential concepts from international relations theory and geopolitics, and causes of war that influence the development and execution of strategy.

A.5.b.2. Block II: “Theories of War and Strategy,” addresses, essentially, the question of how wars are fought. The block begins with an examination of military power and why states use force, as well as a review of the strategic constraints on the use of that power, such as ethics, just war theory, and international law and order. Relying heavily on primary materials of the various theorists and strategists, the block then analyzes theories regarding the employment of military power both strategically and at the high-operational level. After exploring the ancient antecedents of modern strategy and statecraft espoused by the Chinese strategist, Sun Tzu, and the Indian statesman, Kautilya, the block examines the foundational theorists of landpower, Jomini and Clausewitz. The block next introduces theories of sea power and aerospace power as they emerged over time. Hewing to a chronological approach, the block then explores the rise of nuclear deterrence and limited war theory, followed by an investigation of “war among the peoples,” that is the theories that undergird people’s war, insurgency, counterinsurgency, and terrorism. The block next turns to the vital question of conflict termination. How wars end, and what constitutes “winning” or “victory” are vital issues that remain elusive for modern-day strategists and national security professionals. The course concludes with a survey of emerging concepts of warfare that may influence strategy in the near- and mid-term. At the end of the block, students should be able to outline specific warfighting concepts and strategies and will be able to apply, analyze, and evaluate them and their applicability to past, current, and future military operations.

A.6. STUDENT READINGS. Student readings in this directive are annotated as follows:

A.6.a “Student Issue”—Items received prior to the start of the academic year or distributed by the faculty during the year.

A.6.b. "Blackboard”—Copyright items provided digitally via Blackboard.

A.6.c. "Library Reserve”—Items placed on TWS reserve in the library. Please ask the librarians for assistance if you have any difficulty in locating a suggested reading.

A.6.d. “Database”—Library provided databases, such as “ProQuest,” “JSTOR,” “Taylor and Francis”, “EBSCOHOST,” or others. These resources are available through USAWC Library remote access. To link to the reading see Appendix VI and USAWC Library Staff for username and password.

A.6.e. "Online”—Open source online resources available on the Internet. All required reading internet accessible resources will have a hyperlinked web address to indicate that the material is an open source online document.
A.6.f. To view online resources we recommend using Firefox as your web browser, especially when using government computers. Using Microsoft Explorer may result in denied access to a site and particularly pdf files.

A.7. CURRICULAR RELATIONSHIPS. The course directly supports the Program Learning Outcomes (PLOs):

A.7.a. Evaluate theories of war and strategy in the context of national security decision making.

A.7.b. Apply strategic and operational art to develop strategies and plans that employ the military instrument of power in pursuit of national aims.

A.7.c. Evaluate the nature, concepts, and components of strategic leadership and synthesize their responsible application.

A.7.d. Think critically and creatively in addressing security issues at the strategic level.

A.7.e. Communicate clearly, persuasively, and candidly.

A.8. JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION (JPME II). Senior-level, Phase II joint education, is integrated into the resident core curriculum. The Theory of War and Strategy course provides students with the foundation for understanding the joint learning areas involving national security strategy, national military strategy, and theater strategy and campaigning. JPME II Learning Areas and Objectives may be found in Appendix IV. Specific JPME II Learning Areas and Objectives and their application to specific lessons within the Theory of War and Strategy course may be found in Appendix VIII.

B. COURSE REQUIREMENTS.

B.1. GENERAL.

B.1.a. To accomplish the broad objectives of this course requires active contributions to seminar dialogue and activities. Active learning begins with thorough and thoughtful preparation that includes taking notes as you read critically the materials. Students are expected to contribute by accomplishing the required readings, research, and tasks listed in Paragraph 3, Student Requirements, as appropriate, for each lesson or as assigned or modified by your FI. Thorough study and preparation for each seminar supports active participation in seminar dialogue that allows students to contribute to the learning of others, and, in turn, learn from the contributions of others.

B.1.b. To complete Theory of War and Strategy successfully, students will meet established standards in each of the three specific requirements listed below. The FI will evaluate each requirement throughout the course and in a Course Evaluation
Report (CER) at the end. The student’s Faculty Advisor (FA) will use the CER as input to the year-end Academic Evaluation Report that the USAWC renders on each student.

B.2. **SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS.**

B.2.a. Contribution: The FI will evaluate contribution subjectively. There are no set numbers of times daily, weekly, or over the duration of the course that a student must contribute to meet standards. Quality of contribution – in other words, the quality of contribution to seminar learning – is more important than frequency, although frequency counts in that all students are expected to be actively engaged. Contribution will equal 30 percent of the overall TWS grade.

B.2.b. Written Requirements: Each student will complete two written requirements. Written requirement 1 will comprise 20 percent of the overall TWS evaluation. Written requirement 2 will comprise 50 percent of the overall TWS grade.

B.2.b.1. Writing requirement 1 is a guided response paper (so-called because you are responding to a set of questions) that uses Thucydides’ *The Peloponnesian War*. The paper is to be 3-4 pages in length and must be submitted to the FI no later than 30 August. For details on the guided response questions and guidance for preparing the paper, see Appendix I.

B.2.b.2. Writing requirement 2, due to the FI no later than 18 September, calls for each student to research and write a 5-6 page analytical paper on one of two possible topics. Refer to Appendix II for a detailed description of this requirement and guidance for preparing the paper.

B.2.b.3. Evaluation Standard. Faculty will evaluate all writing requirements in accordance with the standards contained in the AY18 Communicative Arts Directive. Specifically, faculty will evaluate the content, organization, and style of the written submission. The criteria for evaluating the paper will address the student’s ability to gather information, conduct research, organize material logically, compose and express thoughts clearly and coherently in effective writing, and use of standard written English expected of educated senior officers and officials. Students may find descriptions of the criteria for evaluations of “Outstanding,” “Exceeds Standards,” “Meets Standards” “Needs Improvement,” and “Fails to Meet Standards” in the Communicative Arts Directive. The FI will return papers that "Need Improvement" or "Fail to Meet Standards" to the student for resubmission until the student achieves a "Meets Standard" evaluation or better. Students who fail to “Meet Standards” within a reasonable period will be referred to academic probation or an Academic Review Board, as appropriate, under provisions of Carlisle Barracks Memorandum 623-1, Student Evaluation, 7 January 2015. Students will find more detailed evaluation rubrics in Appendices I and II.

B.2.c. Academic Integrity.
B.2.c.1. The USAWC upholds the highest standards of academic integrity. This includes a strict academic code requiring students to credit properly the source of information cited in any written work, oral presentation, or briefing created to meet diploma/degree requirements. Simply put, plagiarism – the representation of someone else’s intellectual work as one’s own – is strictly prohibited. Plagiarism, along with cheating and misrepresentation (two other violations of academic integrity) are inconsistent with the professional standards required of military personnel and government employees. Furthermore, in the case of U.S. military officers, such conduct violates the “Exemplary Conduct Standards” delineated in Title 10, U.S. Code, Sections 3583 (U.S. Army), 5947 (U.S. Naval Service), and 8583 (U.S. Air Force).

B.2.c.2. Students with questions concerning academic integrity and plagiarism should confer with their faculty instructor, or consult the AY18 Communicative Arts Directive.
### AY18 TWS Planning Calendar 23 Aug-20 Sep 17

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<td>NTL Jomini Dr. Johnson</td>
<td>NTL—East Asia and Mahan Dr. Bratton</td>
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<td>12 Sep TWS-12-S Theories of Aerospace Power</td>
<td>13 Sep TWS-13-5 Nuclear Strategy and Limited War</td>
<td>14 Sep TWS-14-5 War Among the Peoples: People’s War, Insurgency, COIN, and Terrorism</td>
<td>15 Sep TWS-15-S Victory and Conflict Termination</td>
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<td>NTL—Air Power Dr. Biddle</td>
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D. BLOCK 1.

D.1. FOUNDATIONS OF THEORY, WAR, AND STRATEGY.
In this introductory block, students will learn some key concepts for understanding and analyzing war and strategy. In the first lesson, we examine the nature and character of war and the concept of strategy, major themes of the remainder of the USAWC education program. We next examine the USAWC strategic construct and Dr. J. Boone Bartholomees’ essay that offers a sweeping overview of strategic thought.

The core of this block revolves around a case study using Thucydides’ *The Peloponnesian War*. The text has long been foundational for historians, political scientists, policymakers, and military leaders. For example, in a speech at Princeton University in 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall (also the Army’s Chief of Staff in World War II), underscored the importance of the Peloponnesian War for an understanding of contemporary international affairs. Marshall opined that, “I doubt seriously whether a man can think with full wisdom and with deep convictions regarding certain of the basic issues today who has not at least reviewed in his mind the period of the Peloponnesian War and the fall of Athens.”

The purpose of this case study, therefore, is to examine the fundamental relationships among war, policy, and strategy. Using Marshall’s words as a prompt, we will deeply analyze the most salient insights from *The Peloponnesian War* over three consecutive lessons. We will study concepts such as: What is power, from whence does it come, and how can it be used? We also assess the motivations of the actors by exploring culture, ideas, ideologies, and the tensions between values and interests. What are national or state interests? From whence do they come? We also will consider how uncertainty in the international system creates insecurity, that is, fear and mistrust among states, as they vie for power or hegemony (domination) or an international order favorable to their interests. Modern theorists call this phenomenon the “security dilemma,” whereby tensions and conflicts between states can occur, even unintentionally, as each side defensively reacts to the other’s increase in military capacity or seemingly belligerent measures.

Using Thucydides landmark work as a basis, we will then move forward to more in-depth examinations of key threads of the course. We first examine how theories of international relations and geopolitics illuminate some of the tensions within the international system that can lead to war. We next explore in detail the nature and character of war through the lens of the great Prussian philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz. The two concluding lessons in the block examine more closely the causes of war, conflict prevention, and how military power and the use of force fit into grand strategy and diplomacy.

D.2. LEARNING OUTCOMES. By the end of the block, students should be able to:
D.2.a. Introduce and analyze the concepts of theory, war, and strategy for application in subsequent blocks and courses.

D.2.b. Introduce and analyze the nature and character of war.

D.2.c. Explain how uncertainty in the international system affects cooperation and conflict among nations.

D.2.d. Analyze the relationship between geography and political power in the international system and their influence on strategy.

D.2.e. Synthesize the theoretical concepts of war causation and conflict termination.

D.2.f. Analyze the sources, dimensions, and complexity of power.

D.2.g. Synthesize the theoretical concepts of military power, the use of force within the international system, and the constraints imposed on war and strategy by that system.

D.2.h. Synthesize theories of strategic victory.
D.3. LESSONS

D.3.a. LESSON 1: THEORY, WAR, AND STRATEGY

Dr. Bill Johnsen
245-3293
Mode: Seminar

23 August 2017
0830-1130
TWS-1-S

"The primary purpose of theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become, as it were, confused and tangled. Not until terms and concepts have been defined can one hope to make progress in examining the question clearly and simply and expect the reader to share one’s views.”

- Clausewitz, On War, 132

D.3.a.1. In this first lesson, you begin your exploration of theory of war and strategy. This exploration begs, perhaps, the question, why study theory? For a broad answer, one need only turn once more to the great Prussian philosopher of war who opined that,

“Theory cannot equip the mind with formulas for solving problems, nor can it mark the narrow path on which the sole solution is supposed to lie by planting a hedge of principles on either side. But it can give the mind insight into the great mass of phenomena and of their relationships, then leave it free to rise into the higher realms of action.”

- Clausewitz, On War, 578

More specifically, for the national security professional, theory offers essential definitions and vocabulary and outlines the fundamental ideas, concepts, and premises that underwrite the theory. Theory also links these concepts into an explanatory framework. Not least, theory offers testable hypotheses and means and methods for modifying the theory. For these reasons, and more as you will discover during the course of your studies, practitioners need a solid foundation in theory. In short, to be able to examine war and strategy in their practicalities, one must understand the underlying (and, at times, competing) theories that explain the two phenomena.

D.3.a.2. “War,” according to Joint Publication 1 (JP1), Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, “is the socially sanctioned violence to achieve political purposes.” (I-3) The nature of war, according to most military theorists and historians, is timeless. Certain fundamental aspects of war, such as the role of human decision-making, the impact of natural phenomena, passion, friction, and calculus of means and ways to achieve ends, persist over millennia despite differences in political systems, technologies, and geography, to name but a few considerations. The character of war, however, may radically change over time, highly dependent as it is on scientific innovation, technological changes, demographic shifts, international affairs, and national policies. Each war thus possesses its own distinct character, rooted in the context of its time and place, yet simultaneously shares a common nature with military conflicts from all eras.
D.3.a.3. “Strategy is the alignment of ends (aims, objectives), ways (concepts), and means (resources)—informed by risk—to attain goals.” Strategy is appropriate at several levels – grand, national, and military. (The U.S. military further advances the idea of theater strategy, or: “An overarching construct outlining a combatant commander’s vision for integrating and synchronizing military activities and operations with the other instruments of national power in order to achieve national strategic objectives. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Beyond the realm of strategy, “The operational level links strategy and tactics by establishing operational objectives necessary to achieve the military end states and strategic objectives (JP 1, I-7.) “The tactical level of war is where battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or joint task forces (JTFs).” (JP 1, I7.)) Grand strategy is the use of all elements of national power in peace and war to support a strategic vision of the nation’s role in the world that will best achieve the nation’s core objectives. National strategy, or “the alignment of ends, ways, and means to attain national policy objectives,” provides components of a grand strategy. “Military strategy is the art and science of aligning military ends, ways, and means to support national policy objectives.” (Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations in this paragraph are from Report, Strategy Education Conference, Community of Interest [SEC-COI], 22-24 September 2014.)

D.3.a.4. This course will focus on strategy from a broad historical and international perspective, primarily at the grand and national strategy levels.

D.3.a.5. This lesson includes an introduction to the objectives, structure, and requirements of the Theory of War and Strategy course. Students must be familiar with those basic administrative elements to proceed successfully through the course. Faculty Instructors will discuss most of the essential features of the course, but students must also use the assigned readings or other guidance provided in the course directive.

D.3.a.6. This lesson next will examine some of the key concepts associated with the evolution of strategy over time, and will address the overview of strategic thought contained in the Bartholomees’ reading.

D.3.a.7. Developing and assessing strategies is one of the key tasks of the national security professional, and these concepts will be a key element of this lesson.

D.3.a.7.a. As indicated in the opening pages of this directive, the USAWC strategy construct postulates that strategy is the alignment of ends (aims, objectives), ways (concepts), and means (resources)—informed by risk—to attain goals.

D.3.a.7. b. Again, as outlined earlier in the directive, to test a strategy the USAWC teaches the technique of testing the suitability acceptability, feasibility, and risk (the “SAF-R Test”) of the strategy.
D.3.a.7.c. If you have not yet examined these key concepts, please return to pages 2-6 of this directive, and do so.

D.3.a.8. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

D.3.a.8.a. Outline the Theory of War and Strategy course objectives, block structure, course model, and requirements for course contribution and written assignments.

D.3.a.8.b. Analyze the concept of strategy, the strategic ends-ways-means construct, and techniques of evaluating strategies.

D.3.a.8.c. Describe the distinctions and differences among grand strategy, national strategy, and military strategy.

D.3.a.8.d. Explain the differences between the nature of war and the character of war.

D.3.a.9. Student Requirements.


D.3.a.10. Points to Consider.

D.3.a.10.1. The readings contain various definitions of strategy. What definition do you find most useful and why?

D.3.a.10.2. Is the distinction between levels of strategy necessary? Is it helpful?

D.3.a.10.3. How does one distinguish between policy and strategy? Is such a distinction important?

D.3.a.10.4. What is the difference between the nature and character of war?

D.3.a.10.5. Do you agree with Liddell Hart's assertion that the goal of war is better peace? What are the implications of accepting that argument?
D.3.b. LESSON 2: THUCYDIDES I: THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

Dr. Michael Neiberg
245-3306
Mode: Seminar

24 August 2017
0830-1130
TWS-2-S

D.3.b.1. Introduction.

D.3.b.1.a. This lesson begins our study of a classic of historical analysis and strategic thought, *The Peloponnesian War*, written by the ancient Greek historian, Thucydides. The book is considered to be a classic for many reasons, not the least of which are the ways in which an analysis of the 5th century BCE war between Athens and Sparta can help us interpret and understand the nature of contemporary strategic interaction. We study Thucydides in order to refine our ability to address enduring themes in the study of strategy, including the nature of war, the reasons why wars are fought, the ways in which war may be conducted and won, and the meaning of victory.

D.3.b.1.b. The first of the three lessons that we devote to Thucydides focuses on the nature and character of war itself, and analyses the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. It assesses the roots of the war and the initial strategic assessments of the two major belligerents, Athens and Sparta. The assigned passages from Thucydides’ text address the strategic environment in Greece of the classical age, the historical roots of the conflict, and the ways in which factors such as domestic politics, leadership, alliance commitments, and political and strategic culture affect decision-making.

D.3.b.1.c. Thucydides places particular emphasis on the Athenian leader Pericles. Our readings highlight Pericles’ strategic assessment, his strategy for waging war, and his appreciation of the reasons why Athens is fighting. The latter question is addressed in the famous “funeral oration,” still considered a foundation of modern democratic theory and political thought.

D.3.b.1.d. The Peloponnesian War (431-404 BCE) was primarily a clash between democratic Athens and its “empire” of tributary allies (the Delian League) and oligarchic Sparta and its allies (the Peloponnesian League). Thucydides seems to see the war as inevitable due to underlying power dynamics, but the course of the contest and the ultimate outcome were far from predetermined. At the moment that the war begins, Sparta sees itself as the undisputed leader of the Hellenic world. It embodies conservative, traditional values, is sustained by an agrarian based slave economy, and is a dominant land power with the best-trained and only truly professional army among the Greek city-states. Democratic Athens is a rising challenger, a wealthy trading state and sea power whose national power rests upon its fleet.

D.3.b.1.e. In the readings for this lesson Thucydides provides an assessment of the situation in Greece leading up to the war.
D.3.b.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

D.3.b.2.a. Explain the distinction between the nature and character of war.

D.3.b.2.b. Demonstrate a capacity to assess the strategic environment, using the origins of the Peloponnesian War as a case study.

D.3.b.2.c. Describe how “fear, honor and interests” can affect strategic choices and inspire decisions for war.

D.3.b.2.d. Distinguish the strategic level of warfare, including the challenges of strategic planning and operational design.

D.3.b.3. Student Requirements.

D.3.b.3.a. Tasks. None.

D.3.b.3.b. Required Readings.


READ

Book One

1.1 introduction (page 3)
1.22-1.54 Corcyra (pages 15-33)
1.65-1.87 speech of Archidamus (pages 37-49)
1.119-1.127 speech of Corinthians (pages 65-70)
1.139-1.146 Spartan emissaries; Pericles’ speech on war and war aims (pages 79-85)

Book Two

2.7-2.25 Sparta’s first campaign (pages 93-107)
2.34-2.48 Pericles’ funeral oration (pages 110-118)
2.55-2.65 Sparta’s second campaign, Athens’ plague, Pericles’ death (pages 122-128)

D.3.b.3.c. Suggested Readings.


D.3.b.3.c.2. Victor David Hanson, *A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War* (New York: Random House, 2005).


D.3.b.4. Points to Consider.

D.3.b.4.a. How does warfare in the ancient world differ from warfare today? What common features remain?

D.3.b.4.b. What were the underlying and proximate causes of the Peloponnesian War?

D.3.b.4.c. What are the strengths and weakness in the leadership style of Pericles? Which strategic leadership best exemplifies strategic vision, Pericles or Archidamus?

D.3.b.4.d. What are the political objectives of the main belligerents?

D.3.b.4.e. How do alliances affect the decision for war? Are there lessons to be learned here?

D.3.b.4.f. Thucydides implies that the Peloponnesian War was inevitable. Is he correct?
D.3.c. LESSON 3: THUCYDIDES II: WAGING THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

Dr. Michael Neiberg 25 August 2017 245-3306 0830-1130 Mode: Seminar TWS-3-S

D.3.c.1. Introduction.

D.3.c.1.a. Athens and Sparta chose war as a means to achieve what they considered to be important objectives, but the objectives, and the means selected to pursue them, are not static. Once joined, the dynamic of war imposes strategic adaptation. The strengths of the two major belligerents reflect asymmetries that make victory elusive. The strategies with which Athens and Sparta enter the war prove to be flawed and, as a result, the conflict devolves toward a stalemate. The struggle for hegemony becomes more intense and complex as it becomes protracted in time. In the readings assigned for today’s lesson Thucydides traces the strategic maneuvers that result as the war evolves, and describes ways in which values and culturally grounded restraints are undermined as the conflict extends in time and space.

D.3.c.1.b. The nature of warfare in ancient Greece has clear echoes down to the present. Morality, the search for power, fear, honor, interest, passion, chance, uncertainty, reason, courage, and leadership are all relevant variables that help us to understand the nature of armed conflict. They are brilliantly described in Thucydides’ narrative.

D.3.c.1.c. Athens, with its powerful navy, relies on the tribute paid by allies to maintain its position. Athens is vulnerable to defection by its allies—a strategic weakness that Sparta, encouraged by the resourceful Brasidas, seeks to exploit. Sparta is reliant upon its slave-based agrarian economy, and must remain vigilant against slave rebellion—a concern that an Athenian base at Pylos on the Peloponnesus aggravates. Such concerns lead to the Peace of Nicias, a truce that in principle, temporarily ends major fighting, but according to Thucydides does little to address the underlying sources of hostility.

D.3.c.1.d. Today’s readings conclude with the famous Melian Dialogue, a powerful evocation of the problems of the application of power and respect for moral standards in warfare.

D.3.c.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

D.3.c.2.a. Evaluate how national values, interests, and cultural factors effect strategy.

D.3.c.2.b. Outline how fear, honor, interest and culture drive strategic decision making.
D.3.c.2.c. Analyze the Athenian and Spartan strategies and the ways that they evolve as the war becomes protracted.

D.3.c.2.d. Using the Melian Dialogue as a foundation, discuss ways in which ethical considerations can or should impact upon strategic priorities. Contrast the Athenian choices at Melos with Athenian actions concerning the earlier revolt of Mytilene.

D.3.c.2.e. Explain the sources of national power and the ways that they can contribute to success in warfare.

D.3.c.3. Student Requirements.

D.3.c.3.a. Tasks. None.

D.3.c.3.b. Required Readings.


READ
Book Three
3.1-3.19 revolt of the Mytilenes, pt. I (pages 159-167)
3.25-3.50 revolt of the Mytilenes, pt. II; Cleon, Diodotus (pages 171-184)
3.70-3.86 Corcyraean revolt; Sicily, pt. I (pages 194-202)

Book Four
4.1-4.41 Pylos and aftermath; Sicily, pt. II (pages 223-246)
4.78-4.88 Brasidas’ campaign (pages 266-272)

Book Five
5.1-5.26 Cleon, Brasidas in Thrace; Sicily, pt. III; Peace of Nicias (pages 301-317)
5.84-5.116 Melian Dialogue (pages 350-357)

D.3.c.3.c. Suggested Readings.


D.3.c.4. Points to Consider.

D.3.c.4.a. What role did justice play in the formulation of policy and strategy in ancient Greece? What role does it play today?

D.3.c.4.b. How do governmental institutions and procedures affect policy and strategy?

D.3.c.4.c. In his evaluation of the Corcyraean revolt Thucydides remarks: “war takes away the easy supply of daily wants and so proves a rough master that brings most men’s character to a level with their fortune.” (p. 199). Evaluate this meditation on the corrupting effect of protracted warfare.

D.3.c.4.d. Thucydides refers to the Peace of Nicias as a “treacherous armistice.” In fact, the settlement does not endure—what are the lessons of this episode for conflict termination and conflict resolution efforts?

D.3.c.4.e. “The strong do what they can while the weak suffer what they must.” What are the strategic implications of this statement made by the Athenian envoys to Melos?

D.3.c.4.f. What might account for the differences in Athenian treatment of the revolt at Mytilene (BCE 427) and the neutral island of Melos (BCE 417)?
D.3.d. **LESSON 4: THUCYDIDES III: VICTORY AND DEFEAT**

Dr. Michael Neiberg

245-3306

Mode: Seminar

28 August 2017

D.3.d.1. Introduction.

D.3.d.1.a. During the period of armistice between Athens and Sparta conflict continues through indirect means up to the point where Athens, inspired by the brash young Alcibiades, opts to affect a decisive change in the balance of power by conquering the distant island of Sicily. The Sicilian Expedition is the most carefully elaborated episode in Thucydides’ history. It provides complex examples of strategic planning and vision, operational design, theater campaigning, leadership, and the causes and consequences of defeat.

D.3.d.1.b. Athens’ defeat on Sicily may be regarded as a turning point in the war, but it is not decisive. A third phase of the conflict follows (“the Ionian War”), culminating in a Spartan victory following the battle of Aegospotami in 404 BCE. Thucydides’ history describes events down to the year 411—his contemporary Xenophon records the “rest of the story” in his *Hellenica*. Athens’ defeat is devastating. Explaining the reasons why it occurs is the key problem to be confronted in today’s lesson. What are the factors that spell the difference between victory and defeat in protracted conflicts? How are wars won, and how are they terminated? What is the meaning of victory? Thucydides’ narrative gives us plenty of ammunition to take on these enduring themes in strategic analysis.

D.3.d.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

D.3.d.2.a. Evaluate the reasons for Athens’ defeat in Sicily.

D.3.d.2.b. Analyze the nature of conflict termination at the strategic level.

D.3.d.2.c. Explain why Athens loses the Peloponnesian War.

D.3.d.2.d. Use the example of the Peloponnesian War to develop a theory of victory.

D.3.d.2.e. Describe the sources of national power and the ways that they can contribute to success in warfare.

D.3.d.3. Student Requirements.

D.3.d.3.a. Tasks. None.

D.3.d.3.b. Required Readings.

**Book Six**
- 6.1; 6.6-6.34: Sicily, pt. IV: Athens debates an expedition (page 361 and pages 365-379)
- 6.45-49: Sicily, pt. V: initial reaction to Athenian expedition (pages 386-388)
- 6.61: (Alcibiades recalled pages 395-396)

**Book Seven**
- 7.48-7.76: Sicily, pt. VIII: Athens’ defeat (pages 455-472)

**Book Eight**
- 8.18-8.37: Alliance between Sparta and Persia; revolts throughout the Athenian Empire; Persia buys a Spartan navy (pages 492-502)

**Epilogue**
- 549-554: Athens’ defeat; Persian ascendancy; Philip of Macedon

**REVIEW**
- 2.65: Pericles’ original strategy for Athens


D.3.d.4. Points to Consider.

D.3.d.4.a. Was the Sicilian Expedition a viable strategy badly executed or was it poorly conceived from the start? What accounts for Athens’ catastrophic defeat?
D.3.d.4.b. What are the strengths and weaknesses of Alcibiades and Nicias as strategic leaders?

D.3.d.4.c. How does the dynamic of sea power versus land power shape outcomes in the Peloponnesian War?

D.3.d.4.d. What does the experience of Athens teach us about the sorts of challenges democratic polities confront when engaged in protracted strategic competition against a determined, ideologically hostile adversary?

D.3.d.4.e. How can we explain the outcome, and consequences, of the Peloponnesian War?
D.3.e. LESSON 5: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES AND GEOPOLITICS

COL P. Michael Phillips 29 August 2017
245-3514 0830-1130
Mode: Seminar TWS-5-S

D.3.e.1. Introduction.

D.3.e.1.a. So far, we have discussed the fundamentals of war and strategy using an historical case study, the Peloponnesian War. This lesson concerns international relations, principally the study of state interactions within an international system, usually with implications for foreign policy and strategy. It builds on our earlier lessons in two ways. First, it explores some essential terms and paradigms, or theoretical frameworks, which scholars and policy makers use to understand state behavior as it relates to national security. The three dominant analytical traditions, realism, liberalism and constructivism, are central to our discussion. Second, this lesson touches on geopolitics, what strategist Colin Gray elegantly defines as the ‘spatial study and practice of international relations.’

D.3.e.1.b. Using levels of analysis is the most basic tool for understanding state behavior. One might think of international relations as social life writ large. Just as interpreting human behavior varies from the individual to the group level, explanations of state behavior can change according to one’s level of analysis. At the individual level of analysis, state behavior is framed as a function of its leadership. Here, leadership style, personality, psychology, and decision-making methods rank amongst the key influences in foreign policy making. At the state level of analysis, foreign policy choices are seen as the outgrowth of domestic politics, social movements or bureaucratic processes. And, at the system level of analysis, a state’s behavior is assessed in terms of its relationships with other states, as a subset of the global order. Each level of analysis offers a different frame and thus a different explanation for foreign policy choices. However, rarely will one level of analysis complete the picture.

D.3.e.1.c. In international relations, paradigms are basically widely held views about the nature of the international system and how states behave within it. The three dominant paradigms of international relations, realism, liberalism, and constructivism, each start with a unique set of assumptions about state behavior. Essentially, realists view the international arena as a competitive ‘self-help’ system, in which states necessarily pursue their own interests at the expense of others. Whereas realists tend to focus on interests and conflict, liberals contend there also are opportunities in the international system for cooperation amongst states. Liberals point to agreements, international organizations, and broadly accepted customary norms of behavior as some of the ways states ensure mutual security. In their pure or ‘classical’ sense, realism and liberalism in particular stand in stark contrast to one another. However, thinkers increasingly have expanded on these major traditions to create more nuanced paradigms, such as neorealism, neoliberalism, or realist-constructivism, to
name but a few. Finally, constructivists argue that international relations are not inevitably subject to human nature or the vagaries of the international order. Instead, just as domestic agents and social structures help shape culture, identity, and interests, the norms of international relations are socially constructed over time.

D.3.e.1.d. Geopolitics is yet another way to understand state behavior, although it is more an analytical than conceptual framework. Broadly speaking, geopolitics considers that the quality of the physical space a state occupies forms a powerful influence on that state's world view and subsequent policy choices. Here, history, demography, economy, trade, environment, and natural resource availability are just some of the many variables that frame state security. A term coined by Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén at the end of the 19th century, geopolitics once was most closely associated with realism for its promotion of imperial aims and prescriptions of land and seapower. Modern geopolitics, however, embraces many theoretical perspectives and touches on numerous fields of social inquiry.

D.3.e.1.e. As you navigate this lesson, please bear several points in mind. One, do not conflate the paradigms with political ideology. In other words, liberal theorists are not necessarily socially or politically liberal, just as realists are not necessarily socially or politically conservative. Also, foreign policies are not inherently realist, liberal or geopolitical, even if such worldviews helped to influence their architects. Policies are just policies. Finally, this lesson is at best a short survey of international relations theory. It is not intended to transform you into a political scientist or a political geographer. Instead, this lesson offers you some important tools that help make sense of state behavior and exposes you to a common grammar spoken at the strategic level of public service.

D.3.e.2. Learning Outcomes: By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

D.3.e.2.a. Describe the following key concepts as they apply to the relationships among states in the international political system:

D.3.e.2.a.1. State

D.3.e.2.a.2. Sovereignty

D.3.e.2.a.3. Anarchy

D.3.e.2.a.4. Power

D.3.e.2.a.5. Levels of Analysis

D.3.e.2.b. Outline the major theoretical frameworks of international relations: realism, liberalism and constructivism.
D.3.e.2.c. Describe the spatial aspects of international relations and the influence of 'place' on security and power.

D.3.e.3. Student Requirements.

D.3.e.3.a. Tasks. None.

D.3.e.3.b. Required Readings.


D.3.e.3.c. Suggested Readings.


D.3.e.3.c.5. Nicholas J. Spykman, “Geography and Foreign Policy, II,” The American

D.3.e.4. Points to Consider.

D.3.e.4.a. How might using levels of analysis improve our understanding of international relations? Which theoretical framework seems to work best at each level?

D.3.e.4.b. What might account for changes in the norms of international behavior? How might norms become durable?

D.3.e.4.c. In what ways can geography influence the worldview and strategic choices of states? How might the bountiful geography that the United States inhabits influence our own strategic choices?

D.3.e.4.d. How might theory improve or cloud our understanding of a state’s behavior?
D.3.f. LESSON 6: WHAT IS WAR? CLAUSEWITZ

Dr. Bill Johnsen 30 August 2017
245-3293 0830-1130
Mode: Seminar TWS-6-S

D.3.f.1. Introduction.

D.3.f.1.a. In the last lesson, we explored the various lenses that one can use to analyze the international system. Often, historically, tensions inside a particular international system, especially tensions concerning the accumulation and distribution of power, have led to war. Thus, in this lesson, we strive for a better understanding of war.

D.3.f.1.b. This examination of war begins with arguably its greatest philosopher, the Prussian Carl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz entered Prussian military service as an officer cadet at the age of twelve and participated in the wars against revolutionary France and Napoleon. The defining moment in his life came in October 1806, when Napoleon’s Grande Armee destroyed the vaunted Prussian army at the twin battles of Jena and Auerstadt and the ensuing pursuit. Clausewitz spent the rest of his life trying to come to grips with this traumatic event. His masterwork, On War, was his effort to understand the transformation of war from the limited dynastic wars of the 18th century to the national wars unleashed by the French Revolution and Napoleon.

D.3.f.1.c. On War is not easy to read. Writing in the style of 19th century German idealist and romantic philosophy, Clausewitz used a method known as the dialectic—in which opposite ideas (the thesis and the antithesis) are posed in contrast to one another. Moreover, Clausewitz created On War over many years, and while this process of thinking and writing makes the text incredibly rich and intriguing, that process also hindered a clear exposition. Lastly, Clausewitz died at the relatively young age of 51, leaving behind notes indicating that he intended to revise his work. Unfortunately, it remains unclear which are his last revisions. As a result, practitioners and scholars have been arguing about On War ever since.

D.3.f.1.d. Readings for the lesson begin with an introduction to Clausewitz, his times, and the context of Clausewitz’s ideas in Peter Paret, “Clausewitz” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age.

D.3.f.1.e. The readings next turn to Clausewitz’s, On War. We begin with Clausewitz’s description of theory, followed by his discussion of war. Book 1, Chapter 1, “What is War?” contains Clausewitz’s two classic definitions of war (“an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will” and the “continuation of policy by other means,” as well as his famous concept of the “paradoxical trinity” (violence, chance, and reason). You will want to read this entire chapter carefully, absorbing its language, rhythms, and logic. Clausewitz’s concept of the “trinity,” in particular, has been the source of much confusion and misinterpretation within the U.S. military.
D.3.f.1.f. Book Two, Chapter 3, “Art of War or Science of War,” examines another important aspect of Clausewitz’s views on art, science, and theory of war.

D.3.f.1.g. The next readings are from Book 8. In a note dated 10 July 1827, Clausewitz disclaimed, “Several chapters of it have been drafted, but they must not in any sense be taken in final form. They are really no more than a rough working over of the raw materials, done with the idea that the labor itself would show what the real problems were.” Nonetheless, this material represents some of his most refined thoughts on key theoretical concepts surrounding “absolute vs. real” war and the role of war as an instrument of policy.

D.3.f.1.h. In the last group of readings, we return to Book 1 and delve more deeply into the problems that Clausewitz identified as part of the very nature of war (i.e. present in all times and in all ages): fog, friction, danger, and the role that the “genius” of the commander can play in overcoming them.

D.3.f.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

D.3.f.2.a. Analyze the meaning of war as an instrument of policy.

D.3.f.2.b. Analyze Clausewitz’s distinction between absolute and real war.

D.3.f.2.c. Assess Clausewitz’s theory of the “paradoxical trinity” and its application to current and future strategic problems.

D.3.f.2.d. Analyze Clausewitz’s concept of military genius and the role of the commander.

D.3.f.3. Student Requirements.

D.3.f.3.a. Tasks. None.

D.3.f.3.b. Required Readings.


READ (in order):
Book One:
  Chapter 1, “What is War?,” 75-89.
Book Two, Chapter 3, “Art of War or Science of War,” 148-150.
Book Eight
Chapter 1, “Introduction,” 577-578.
Chapter 3a, “Interdependence of the Elements of War,” 582-584.
Chapter 3b, “Scale of the Military Objective and of the Effort to be Made,” 585-586
(end of second full paragraph: “...whether these roles are united in a single individual or not.”) and 593 (start of third full paragraph: “At this point our historical....”) - 594.
Chapter 6b, “War is an Instrument of Policy,” 605-608.

Book One
Chapter 4, "On Danger in War," 113-114.
Chapter 7, "Friction in War," 119-121.

D.3.f.3.c. Suggested Readings.


D.3.f.3.c.5. Stuart Kinross, Clausewitz and America: Strategic Thought and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq (London: Routledge, 2008).


D.3.f.3.d. Optional Video Clips.


D.3.f.3.d.2. Antulio Echevarria, “Clausewitz and Contemporary Warfare,” 64:00 (start at
D.3.f.3.d.3. Donald Stoker, “Clausewitz: His Life and Work,” 46:03. He addresses Clausewitz’s experience as a soldier up to minute 26. If you want to focus on theory, see 26:00 to 46:03, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g8K312sz9to (accessed April 10, 2017).


D.3.f.4. Points to Consider.

D.3.f.4.a. How does Clausewitz define real war as opposed to war on paper? Are the two definitions contradictory? What are the practical implications of each?

D.3.f.4.b. What is the trinity Clausewitz describes, and, what is its applicability in the modern strategic environment?

D.3.f.4.c. What is “absolute war,” according to Clausewitz, and how is it different from "real war?"

D.3.f.4.d. What are the key characteristics that Clausewitz identifies in an effective commander? Are the elements he discusses essential for today’s commanders, and, if so, at what level of command? Is any element obsolete today?

D.3.f.4.e. Given what you have read from Clausewitz, what is the relevance of Clausewitz’s theory for both policymakers and military strategists today?

D.3.f.4.f. Which areas of Clausewitzian theory do you think may be most susceptible to misinterpretation?

D.3.f.4.g. For Clausewitz, what constitutes the appropriate roles and relationships between the rulers or statesmen and the commander?
D.3.g. LESSON 7: THE CAUSES OF WAR AND THE CONDITIONS OF PEACE

Dr. Frank L. Jones
245-3126
Mode: Seminar

31 August 2017
0830-1130
TWS-7-S

D.3.g.1. Introduction.

D.3.g.1.a. This lesson examines two issues that are important in the study of war. The first is fundamental—the causes of war. The reasons why wars occur and recur is a significant topic in political science as well as in military and diplomatic history, but it is an important subject in other disciplines such as anthropology and biology. We will explore how scholars in these various fields understand the origins of conflict. Using the international relations theories you studied in lesson five is a good place to start, with attention to the levels of analysis. Yet, even this handy framework is not conclusive because of definitional problems and the lack of reliable linkages between cause and effect, as John Garnett points out in his essay. Further, as Robert Jervis asserts, psychology has a role, too, including such elements as rational calculation (losses or costs versus gains), judgment, pessimistic or optimistic dispositions, and the capacity to estimate accurately the consequences of one’s actions. Further, the issue is of importance to national security practitioners. Policymakers often want to know under what conditions a state will cooperate or how they can induce a potential adversary to commit to an enforceable agreement or submit to mediation rather than resort to war. Conditions are also important for conflict prevention, as there may be aggravating conditions that make an outbreak more probable or inhibiting conditions that restrain conflict. Lastly, our discussion of the causes of war should not be limited to inter-state war, but should assist us in studying civil wars, revolts, or a state’s decision to intervene militarily for humanitarian reasons.

D.3.g.1.b. The second component of this lesson, which directly supports the discourse on the theory of war is how the character of states and their political systems can influence international relations. While Garnett offers a survey of the causes of war, his personal view is that of a realist. On the other hand, Michael Doyle’s essay represents a liberal paradigm. In the section of his essay titled “Liberal Internationalism,” he revives and augments Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant’s belief, found in his treatise Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795), that liberal states do not go to war with each other. U.S. policymakers embraced this academic theory of “democratic peace” after the Cold War ended. The Clinton administration used it as a foundational idea for its 1994 National Security Strategy and its decision to pursue NATO enlargement. George W. Bush’s administration used the concept to justify the liberation of Iraq in 2003, and the Obama administration chose to use it tenets to rationalize its intervention in Libya by supporting rebels against the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. As political scientist Richard Betts emphasizes, liberal theory seems to resonate with international actors during times of optimism, when values are ascendant in foreign policy. It remains to be seen if this theory has any purchase in the Trump administration or among other liberal states as
a cornerstone of their foreign policy objectives in the contemporary security environment.

D.3.g.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

D.3.g.2.a. Identify and analyze the various causes of war Garnett identifies in his essay, and analyze them within the context of the previous lessons (international relations theory, Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War, Clausewitz's theory, etc.).

D.3.g.2.b. Describe the areas of misperception that Jervis highlights and assess how they can lead to an outbreak of hostilities.

D.3.g.2.c. Identify the three forms of liberalism that Doyle discusses and analyze the assumptions underlying "democratic peace" theory.

D.3.g.3. Student Requirements.

D.3.g.3.a. Tasks.

D.3.g.3.a.1. Read, understand, and analyze the causes of war from a multidisciplinary perspective and consider how war might be prevented using a variety of instruments of national power.

D.3.g.3.b. Required Readings.


D.3.g.3.c. Suggested Readings.


D.3.g.4. Points to Consider.

D.3.g.4.a. Which of the causes of war that Garnett delineates do you find most credible as an explanation?

D.3.g.4.b. Is war inevitable? If it is, what are the conditions that promote its occurrence? If not, then are there conditions under which conflict can be prevented?

D.3.g.4.c. How do the three principal schools of international relations theory (realism, liberalism and constructivism) understand the causes of war?

D.3.g.4.d. Historian Geoffrey Blainey argues, “Power is the crux of many explanations of war and peace.” How might the distribution of power among states promote war or peace?

D.3.g.4.e. Jervis offers reasons why misperceptions contributed to the origins of World Wars I and II. Do you find his argument convincing? Provide evidence to support your position.
D.3.g.4.f. Is war an instrument of policy, as Clausewitz claims, or is it a failure of diplomacy because the parties could not reach an agreement about how to settle their dispute peacefully?

D.3.g.4.g. What factors does Doyle believe contribute to peace among liberal states, but may result in conflict between liberal states and non-liberal states?
E. BLOCK II

E.1. THEORIES OF WAR AND STRATEGY.

This block moves from the general examination of war and strategy to address the more specific question of how to conduct war. As we study specific theorists and strategists, you should analyze how that theorist or strategist thinks about war, as well as why a strategist thinks wars should be fought. Your analysis also should consider how a theorist or strategist believes a state or a non-state actor should fight a war, and how such wars might be won.

We begin by examining the roles of military power and how military force might be used in pursuit of national interests and objectives. We also will explore what types of strategic constraints might influence the use of such power.

From this beginning, we consider the realm of strategy, or how wars might be fought. This examination builds on the insights already introduced by Thucydides and Clausewitz as we address the ancient masters, Sun Tzu, the Chinese philosopher of war; and Kautilya, an early Indian theorist of statecraft. We specifically explore what they have to say about the nature and character of war, and about strategy. We do so not simply to find historical perspective, but because these theorists set the foundation for the study of war, strategy, and statecraft, and their concepts continue to resonate in the contemporary international security environment.

Next, we will explore domain theories of warfare. In evaluating any military instrument of power, it is essential to understand the theory or theories upon which its utility rests. A fundamental question is, therefore: What are the mechanisms that link the use of an instrument of military power with the political objectives sought? Answers to such a question should help you examine the utility, effectiveness, and decisiveness of the theories of land, maritime, and aerospace domains.

Using a chronological approach, this examination begins with landpower. We start with the concepts and theories of Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini, a Swiss military officer and contemporary of Napoleon and Clausewitz. Arguably, Jomini continues to exert tremendous influence over U.S. military strategy, and, as you will find in the Theater Strategy and Campaigning Course, operational art. We will then compare and contrast Jomini with the views of Clausewitz concerning strategy. We will look successively at their theories of war, their understanding of ends, ways, and means, and the relationship between war and policy. We will also consider how these theorists apply to modern warfare. The lesson closes with a proposed theory of landpower for the 21st century.

Next, we will move into an analysis of the other traditional domains of sea and aerospace power. Chronologically, we begin with the theorists of sea or maritime power: American Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (who was also a geopolitical theorist), and the British strategist, Sir Julian Corbett. Turning to aerospace power, we examine
the foundational writings of Giulio Douhet and trace the development over time of, first, airpower and, later, aerospace power. We will examine the utility, effectiveness, and decisiveness of the theories of the maritime and aerospace domains.

The investigation of strategy turns from domains to the strategies that emerged at the end of World War II, as the world tried to come to grips simultaneously with the new complexities of nuclear arms and nuclear deterrence and the theories of limited war. Issues surrounding nuclear power recently have regained relevance because of international concern about attainment of national strategic aims in a globalized world with increased interdependence and renewed nuclear proliferation. In the case of limited war, the experience of the last fifty years has made imperative a better understanding of the theories of people’s war, insurgency, counterinsurgency, and terrorism. We will examine how these strategic theories complement classic concepts of strategy, as well as how they might add to the strategist’s intellectual toolkit.

In light of the complexity of an increasingly volatile international security environment, the course turns to the vitally important matter of conflict termination. Specifically, given the experience of the United States and its allies and partners in the last fifteen years, we will examine the questions of what do “winning” or “victory” looks like in the contemporary security environment?

Finally, we conclude the course by exploring concepts that have emerged more recently. Topics will include the so-called “gray area warfare,” cyber warfare, and the differing schemas of terrorism practiced by Al Qaida and ISIL. Readings also will examine emerging concepts of future warfare from the military strategy of the People’s Republic of China, as well as from Russian military leaders. We will investigate how such concepts, individually or collectively, might influence the future of strategy. Throughout this lesson, we will stress the interaction of continuity and change as we try to separate the truly new from the simply unfamiliar.

As we examine theories and theorists, we will continue to use the strategy construct—the relationship of ends, ways, and means—to guide our thinking. We will use historical examples to study various aspects of war and strategy. The ability to use historical analysis effectively and to assess the strategy of past conflicts is essential to progress as a strategic thinker. We are studying strategy at the national and theater levels and should strive to think expansively, creatively, and critically in dealing with the broad strategic problems.

E.2. OUTCOMES. By the end of the block, students should be able to:

E.2.a. Synthesize the constraints imposed on war and strategy by ethical considerations.

E.2.b. Analyze the writings of Sun Tzu and Kautilya as foundational theorists of war and strategy for the contemporary strategic environment.
E.2.c Analyze the theories and writings of Jomini and Clausewitz about strategy.

E.2.d Analyze theories of military power on the sea, in the air and space, and on land, comprehending their historical and contemporary strategic applications.

E.2.e Analyze the concept of limited war in the modern era, and assess the factors that constrain conflict in terms of ends, ways, and means.

E.2.f Analyze theories of nuclear power and deterrence and their contemporary and future strategic applicability.

E.2.g Analyze the theories of insurgency, people’s war, counterinsurgency, and terrorism.

E.2.h Analyze what “winning” and “victory” mean in the contemporary international security environment.

E.2.i Analyze the nature and character of war in the future and the implications for strategy formulation and execution.
E.3. LESSONS

E.3.a. LESSON 8: MILITARY POWER, THE USE OF FORCE AND STRATEGIC CONSTRAINTS

Dr. Frank L. Jones
245-3126
Mode: Seminar

5 September 2017
0830-1130
TWS-8-S

E.3.a.1. Introduction.

E.3.a.1.a. This lesson, which directly supports the discourse on the role of war in international politics, is the subject of how military power can be used. While the conventional perspective is to focus on military power as a means of effecting defeat through violence and damage to persons and property, political leaders do not always seek destruction as a means of attaining a policy objective. Thus, military power is useful in a number of ways other than using the so-called “kinetic” measures. These components of security policy include reassurance of allies and strategic partners through presence, and dissuasion, whereby a nation uses its military strength to preclude an adversary or potential adversary from seeking parity or surpassing it.

E.3.a.1.b. The nature of war is also a philosophical subject with immediate practical implications for the military leader and the strategist. Thomas Schelling, who received the 2005 Nobel Prize in economics for enhancing an understanding of conflict and cooperation using game-theory analysis, wrote in his classic work, *Arms and Influence*, that the concept of the power to hurt, as opposed to the power to seize and hold, is essential to understanding the nature of military power. From this distinction and working in an era under the Soviet nuclear threat, Schelling drew conclusions about coercion and deterrence theory and their relation to the human psyche (similar to Jervis’s concerns) that are essentially a different way of envisioning war and the political use of force. As someone steeped in economic theory (the ability to generate the force necessary to defeat an opponent at an acceptable cost), Schelling was not making a moral judgment about the use of nuclear weapons. Further, as an economist, he assumed that decision makers were “rational actors” (homo economicus), that is, they have the ability to make rational decisions based on possessing perfect information, formulating a set of all possible options, weighing costs and benefits, and then selecting the option that would deliver the greatest benefit relative to cost.

E.3.a.1.c. Like many theorists, strategists, and military officers writing during the height of the Cold War, Schelling firmly believed the security environment had undergone a profound change because of technology. Advances in nuclear weapons, high-speed aircraft, and intercontinental ballistic missiles had momentous consequences for the conduct of war. Thus, as a game theorist, he was interested in how these weapons could be used as bargaining tools (he called them “important symbols”) in the strategic calculus of the two superpowers. That calculus was defined
by time (speed to target vice distance), command and control and decision making (in another chapter he uses the terms “competition in risk taking,” and “manipulation of risk”) and political will as essential factors in military victory and, particularly, with respect to the survival of the state (a vital interest). Schelling moved from passive deterrence to active coercion. He replaced the reactive retaliatory strike with the symbol of being poise to strike. Such a position signified to the adversary that the United States was prepared to bend the opponent’s will to that of the United States. Victory may result from such a credible threat, rather than its execution. This focus on managing risk underscores how the concept of credibility became critical to the United States as an adjunct of national power not only for nuclear war, but in conventional war, as was the case regarding the use of U.S. airpower during the Vietnam War.

E.3.a.1.d. Additionally, it is important to remember that war is never conducted in a vacuum, and many of the factors that influence its environment provide opportunities for, or impose constraints upon, strategic leaders and strategists. Understanding those factors is essential to success in the strategic arena. One of the largest, most effective (at least for traditional western strategy), and potentially most limiting strategic considerations is the moral philosophy of war and its major expression in the just war tradition and the laws of modern warfare.

E.3.a.1.e. The just war tradition is ancient. Warriors have always had some moral norm for issues like the treatment of women, children, and prisoners. This was often evident in terms of honor; some acts have commonly been deemed honorable, while others are dishonorable. The specifics of what is considered honorable may differ from age to age and culture to culture, but the concept is widespread, if not universal. What we study today as just war theory is derived from Greek and Roman philosophy, Jewish and Christian theology, and secular military customs. Influential thinkers in the just war tradition include Cicero, Augustine, Aquinas, Vitoria, and Grotius, along with modern ethicists Paul Ramsey, Michael Walzer, James Turner Johnson, and Anthony Coates.

E.3.a.1.f. In keeping with this tradition, Sir Michael Howard grapples with the issue of whether there can be “moderation in the conduct of war” (translation of temperamenta belli). Howard, a decorated World War II combat veteran and renowned military historian, starts his essay with a quote from Clausewitz’s On War, and offers in response, as a first principle, that war is not in essence, uncontrollable. Because war is a social activity, humans place controls or limitations on war through the application of moral precepts and law. As he points out, international law and the law of armed conflict are closely related to the just war tradition. Some theorists contend that international law is mere window dressing—usually based on the argument of the 17th century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes that “covenants, without the sword, are but words”—but international law exists and affects state behavior, as well as the behavior of many responsible non-state actors. With the creation of the International Criminal Court and its entry into force in 2002, international law is now designed to help end impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community.
E.3.a.2. Learning Outcomes. At the end of the lesson, the student should be able to:

E.3.a.2.a. Analyze and evaluate the role of military power in international relations and describe its application.

E.3.a.2.b. Analyze Schelling’s concept of "hurting" as a violent diplomatic tool, and evaluate how it may impact decision making by political and military leaders, particularly with respect to strategic risk.

E.3.a.2.c. Analyze the strategic considerations inherent in the just war tradition and how it and the other restraints that Howard specifies affect the conduct of war.

E.3.a.3. Student Requirements.

E.3.a.3.a. Tasks. Read, understand, and analyze the required essays about the role of war in its historical context and for its current and future application.

E.3.a.3.a.1. As you read, use the following questions to help organize your thoughts:

E.3.a.3.a.1.a. What is war?

E.3.a.3.a.1.b. Why should war be fought?

E.3.a.3.a.1.c. How should war be fought? (Offense vs. defense, long vs. short, attrition vs. annihilation, etc.)

E.3.a.3.a.2. Based on your study of the theorists in this lesson, identify concepts of enduring relevance that influence modern strategic thinking, especially with respect to ends-ways-means and strategic risk.

E.3.a.3.b. Required Readings.


E.3.a.3.c. Suggested Readings.


E.3.a.4. Points to Consider.

E.3.a.4.a. What are the political purposes of military power?

E.3.a.4.b. Is the use of force a failure of diplomacy?

E.3.a.4.c. Is force a last resort for a state? Alternatively, is it a viable policy option at every step of the foreign policy-making process?

E.3.a.4.d. Does Schelling’s concept of using military force to hurt or coerce have practical applicability? How or why not?

E.3.a.4.e. What does the Just War tradition attempt to achieve? Has it been an effective constraint on war-making?
E.3.a.4.f. Is international law effective? Why or why not? Why should a strategist consider it in his/her deliberations?

E.3.a.4.g. Does the relative power of states in the international system affect how international law can be used to modify state behavior?
E.3.b. LESSON 9: ANCIENT MASTERS – SUN TZU AND KAUTILYA

Dr. Paul Kan/Dr. Larry Goodson
245-3021/245-3176
Mode: Lecture/Seminar

6 September 2017
0830-1130
TWS-9-L/S

E.3.b.1. Introduction.

E.3.b.1.a. Previous lessons have examined the nature, character, and various definitions of war; we continue this discussion by focusing on two other conceptions of what war is and how it is best fought. Twenty-five centuries before Clausewitz, the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu (also known as Sun Zi) wrote *The Art of War* that is the earliest existing work about military affairs. Present-day scholars generally understand Sun Tzu’s writing to have evolved during the last half of the 4th century BCE, that the chapters were written at different times, and that it was, perhaps, the effort of more than one person. Nonetheless, this work has influenced modern thinking on strategy as much as Clausewitz or others you will read in this course. We will begin our lesson today with a Bliss Hall lecture explaining the historical and personal context of Sun Tzu’s life and times.

E.3.b.1.b. Although Sun Tzu was written millennia ago, his relevance still shines through today. He begins his book on strategic thought with the observation that war is of vital importance to the state and deserves thorough study. A student at the Army War College could hardly disagree. Best known for aphoristic comments on how to conduct war—such as “All warfare is based on deception” (p.66) — Sun Tzu’s work should not be understood simply as a collection of proverbs. Instead, his style of writing is a form of wisdom literature, a philosophical guide through which the student learns the art of generalship by internalizing certain principles. Sun Tzu’s writing has had a substantial influence on Chinese political and military strategy in the past two millennia, and *The Art of War* occupies an important place in East Asian intellectual history. One can see his influence on Mao Zedong, the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and of the People’s Republic of China, who accorded Master Sun’s tenet that if one knows oneself and one’s adversary, one will not be vanquished in a thousand battles (p.84), as a “scientific truth.” China’s island building in the South China Sea may also be viewed as an extension of Sun Tzu’s notion to win without fighting. So valued is Sun Tzu in China and around Asia that the leaders of today’s China see him as a cultural icon who can be exported as a part of “soft power” along with other towering Chinese figures like Confucius.

E.3.b.1.c. Kautilya (also known as Chanakya) wrote his treatise *Arthashastra* (often translated from the Sanskrit as The Science of Polity) in the 4th century BCE. As is the case with Sun Tzu, the text is likely the product of his work and later modifications by his followers. Regardless, Kautilya served as an advisor to the Indian king Chandragupta Maurya, founder of the Maurya Empire (ruled circa 320 BCE – 298 BCE). The purpose of *Arthashastra* was to educate the king on how to rule and inform him of the elements necessary for maintaining power while undermining the
capabilities of his enemies. In other words, it is a manual of statecraft. While the text discusses bureaucratic administration of the state like other texts of this type of political writing (called "mirrors for princes"), it pays particular attention to war, preparation for it, and its successful execution. Kautilya’s instructions are considered a forerunner of political realism (realpolitik), earning him comparison with Machiavelli, the great Italian Renaissance thinker and his work, The Prince, for its practical insights. In some ways, Kautilyan theory also foreshadows Bismarckian diplomacy that characterized the second half of the 19th century in Europe.

E.3.b.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

E.3.b.2.a. Outline Sun Tzu’s theory of war and compare it to Kautilya’s theories.

E.3.b.2.b. Analyze and synthesize the fundamental concepts of both theorists in light of rising Asian power, and assess their value to the modern student of war, policy, and strategy.

E.3.b.3. Student Requirements.

E.3.b.3.a. Tasks. None.

E.3.b.3.b. Required Readings.


E.3.b.3.c. Suggested Readings.


E.3.b.3.c.6. Charles Chao Rong Phua, “From the Gulf War to Global War on Terror—A Distorted Sun Tzu in US Strategic Thinking?” *RUSI Journal* 152, no. 6 (December 2007): 46-53.


Siddique Alam (Mirpur Dhaka, Bangladesh: Defence Services Command and Staff College, 1998).

E.3.b.4. Points to Consider.

E.3.b.4.a. If war is of vital interest to the state, what are the motives of political leaders and generals for conducting war in the manner Sun Tzu advocates?

E.3.b.4.b. What lessons does Sun Tzu have for contemporary strategic leaders regarding unconventional warfare?

E.3.b.4.c. Does Sun Tzu promote a form of Just War theory (during war and in its aftermath)?

E.3.b.4.d. How does Sun Tzu understand the relationship between the political leader and the general (i.e., civil-military relations)? How does Kautilya?

E.3.b.4.e. What lessons do Kautilya or Sun Tzu offer contemporary strategic leaders regarding unconventional or irregular warfare?

E.3.b.4.f. Does Kautilya’s concept of permanent war fit the modern democratic state or the current international order?

E.3.b.4.g. What elements of Kautilya’s and Sun Tzu’s theories do you find useful for modern strategists? Are there anachronistic elements? Are there ideas that are too culturally specific to their time and place?
E.3.c. **LESSON 10: THEORIES OF LANDPOWER**

Dr. Bill Johnsen
245-3293
Mode: Seminar
7 September 2017
0830-1130

E.3.c.1. Introduction.

E.3.c.1.a. Having examined the ancient foundations of strategy and statecraft offered by Sun Tzu and Kautilya, our survey of strategy turns to the first of the lessons that address more contemporary strategic domains. As the conduct of war on land has the longest historical trace, we first focus on the employment of landpower, particularly since the wars of Napoleon.

E.3.c.1.b. Those steeped in the application of landpower may question the need to examine what they might perceive as a self-evident concept. However, the foundational theories and concepts of landpower may not be as apparent as they first appear, especially for those less practiced in its employment. Moreover, the changing character of war over time, particularly the accelerating pace of technology and the emergence of new, complementary, and sometimes competing domains (such as sea, aerospace, space, and cyberspace) may have rendered the role of landpower less self-evident. At the very least, a fuller understanding of landpower will help establish a basis for the dialogue that will follow on various theories of other domains.

E.3.c.1.c. The lesson begins by addressing the seminal contributions of Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, one of the most influential military thinkers of the 19th and 20th centuries. Using extracts from his influential work, *The Art of War*, you will explore Jomini’s ideas on war, strategy, and operational art, to include Jomini’s considerable and continuing influence on U.S. Joint and Army doctrine.

E.3.c.1.d. In the second portion of the lesson, we return to examining the ideas of Clausewitz, which, in some ways, are an extension of our earlier exploration of his thoughts on war in lesson 6. While Clausewitz did not speak specifically on the concept of landpower, such a distinction would have been unnecessary. For him, war was the application of landpower. Having explored Clausewitz’s ideas about strategy (as opposed to those on war), you will be able to compare and contrast his thoughts with those of Jomini.

E.3.c.1.e. The third element of the lesson examines a proposed theory of landpower for the 21st century. Such a theory is important for, while the nature of war may be immutable, the character of warfare is not. As warfare evolves beyond the concept of joint operations or even joint interdependence, national security professionals require a firm conceptual understanding of landpower if national and military leaders are to integrate and synthesize all aspects of military power into a coherent whole to serve national interests.
E.3.c.1.f. As you examine the various theories and strategies of landpower, recall Clausewitz’s observation: “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.” (Book 1, Chapter 7, p. 119.) Consider, for example, that while the concept of landpower may be obvious to many, it is opaque to others. In exploring the theory of landpower, ask yourself, what is it? How should we define the concept in modern terms? What constitutes landpower? How might landpower interact with the theories of the aerospace and sea power, as well as the emerging concepts of cyberpower and cyberwar?

E.3.c.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

E.3.c.2.a. Analyze the ideas of Antoine Henri de Jomini and their utility to the modern student of war, policy, and strategy.

E.3.c.2.b. Compare and contrast the key tenets of Clausewitz and Jomini.

E.3.c.2.c. Outline a modern theory of landpower and assess its value for modern warfare.

E.3.c.3. Student Requirements.

E.3.c.3.a. Tasks. None.

E.3.c.3.b. Required Readings.


READ (in order):
Book Two
  Chapter 1, "Classifications of the Art of War," 127- end of paragraph on top of p. 129 (line 10); and page 131, next to last paragraph ("To sum up :...")-132.
Book Three
  Chapter 1, "Strategy," 177-178.
Book Eight
Chapter 9, "The Plan of War Designed to Lead to the Total Defeat of the Enemy," 617-618.


E.3.c.3.c. Suggested Readings.


E.3.c.4. Points to Consider.

E.3.c.4.a. Jomini generally is considered the father of western operational theory, although he believed himself to be a strategist. Do Jomini’s views on war and strategy remain valid? Can we extrapolate from his operational ideas into the realm of modern strategy?

E.3.c.4.b. Where do Clausewitz and Jomini converge? Diverge? Does it matter?

E.3.c.4.c. What are the strengths and weaknesses of landpower in the modern strategic environment?

E.3.c.4.d. What constitutes a theory of landpower in the 21st century?
Whether they will or not, Americans must now begin to look outward.

- Alfred Thayer Mahan

Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been decided – except in the rarest cases – either by what your army can do against your enemy’s territory and national life, or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do.

- Julian Corbett

E.3.d.1. Introduction.

E.3.d.1.a. As we have noted before, in evaluating any military instrument of power it is essential to understand the theory or theories upon which its utility rests. A fundamental question is, therefore: What is the mechanism that links the use of an instrument of military power with the political objective that one seeks to achieve by its use? In this lesson, we ask: How does the use of sea power contribute to achieving the political aims an actor is seeking, either in wartime or in peacetime? In this lesson, we will discuss theories of sea power, both in terms of a broader maritime strategy and a more focused naval strategy.

E.3.d.1.b. This is the second of three lessons focusing on the domains in which leaders execute strategy and fight wars. This study follows the lesson on landpower and precedes the lesson on airpower. Many of the concepts developed to understand maritime strategy, like sea control and sea denial, will be used and modified to conceptualize other domains like air, space, and cyber power. We will again come back to several of the ideas and concepts discussed in this lesson in National Security Policy and Strategy (rules based international order, instruments of power, etc.), Theater Strategy and Campaigning (sea service operating concepts), and Defense Management (how the United States invests in sea service capabilities). The noontime lecture before this lesson will help set up the context for this lesson.

E.3.d.1.c. This lesson on sea power, therefore, aims to assist student understanding of the use and exploitation of one of the global commons. The application of naval power from the sea diminishes sovereignty issues, thus making sea power, often in concert with land and airpower, a practical tool in influencing events on land. Maritime power has tangible links to economy and geopolitics as 70 percent of the earth’s surface is covered by ocean, 80 percent of the world’s population lives within 100 km of the sea, 90 percent of world commerce travels by sea, 90 percent of U.S. military assets move by sea and the overwhelming percentage of international cyber communication is accomplished by undersea cable. These figures are intended to illustrate that how a nation approaches access to the sea, its basing, and its naval
power will fundamentally affect its ability to develop and execute national and military strategy.

E.3.d.1.d. America is fundamentally a maritime power, and this lesson examines sea power and grand strategy. Because the oceans connect our world, maritime thinking is inherently global and therefore, we re-examine geopolitical thought in this lesson. Students likewise will recall Thucydides’ account of Athens as a maritime power and discover how the concepts of the Peloponnesian War apply to the modern, globalized world.

E.3.d.1.e. Geostrategist Alfred Thayer Mahan was American. He was the first to codify a theory of sea power in the late nineteenth century, several millennia after trade by sea began, and navies were created. Mahan’s timing was not accidental. The United States had recently concluded the Civil War and connected its internal lines of communication through completion of the transcontinental railroad. Mahan urged America, growing in might, to turn its focus away from its own shores and to look outward. He advocated for access and basing throughout the world to advance America’s economy through trade and to establish the country as a global maritime power. Recognizing the sea as a great commons, he further argued for a powerful navy to command the seas to protect America’s economic interests and as an instrument of military might. Mahan argued that throughout history, all great powers have been maritime powers, and his strategic vision has had profound and lasting impact on the character of the United States.

E.3.d.1.f. British theorist and strategist Julian Corbett, a near contemporary of Mahan, wrote on maritime strategy in a way that was less grand, but more sophisticated than did Mahan. Although he accepted that sea power was essential to the economy of a nation, he focused his thinking more on naval power and in military strategic terms that Clausewitz would recognize. Arguing that concentration of naval power to command the seas was not necessarily practical or advantageous, he argued instead that sea control, local and temporal as needed, was the key enabler to employing land power. A true Joint thinker, Corbett offered that armies and navies must be used interdependently to achieve political purpose.

E.3.d.1.g. Your readings are divided into three groups. You first have an overview of the key ideas and concepts of both Mahan and Corbett by Gooch, and a short reading by Corbett. These will give you a good grounding in how both theorists viewed the nature of sea power and naval strategy. The second section by renowned naval theorist, Geoffrey Till, is a conceptual lens you can use to examine how different navies are shaped by globalization. The final group looks at the influence of Mahan and maritime thinking on rising power in Asia, in particular China. Has the United States (and the West) turned their back on the sea, and is this now China (or Asia’s) “Mahanian moment”?

E.3.d.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:
E.3.d.2.a. Analyze the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett and apply them in the modern strategic environment.

E.3.d.2.b. Describe how sea power encompasses maritime power and naval power, and is linked to economy and globalization.

E.3.d.2.c. Outline the concept of the sea as a global commons.

E.3.d.3. Student Requirements.

E.3.d.3.a. Tasks. None.

E.3.d.3.b. Required Readings.


E.3.d.3.d. Suggested videos. If you are unfamiliar with maritime issues, you might find the following videos of use:

E.3.d.3.d.1. If you are interested in the importance of maritime trade to the global economy this TED talk on the shipping industry is informative (14 min): https://www.ted.com/talks/rose_george_inside_the_secret_shipping_industry (accessed April 11, 2017)


E.3.d.4. Points to Consider.

E.3.d.4.a. Compare and contrast the theories of Mahan and Corbett.

E.3.d.4.b. Should strategy incorporate sea power in the age of globalization?

E.3.d.4.c. How is sea power integral to the military and economic instruments of national power?

E.3.d.4.d. How does naval power complement land, air, and cyber power?

E.3.d.4.e. Are Mahan’s theories on sea power relevant to the rise of China and other Asian states?
E.3.e. **LESSON 12: THEORIES OF AEROSPACE POWER**

Col Ed Kaplan

11 September 2017

245-3341

Mode: Seminar

A modern, autonomous, and thoroughly trained Air Force in being at all times will not alone be sufficient, but without it there can be no national security.

- General H. H. 'Hap' Arnold, USAAF

**E.3.e.1. Introduction.**

E.3.e.1.a. As we have previously observed, to understand an instrument of military power, you must understand its underlying rationale. A fundamental question is, therefore: What links the use of an instrument of military power with the political objective one is seeking? In this lesson, we ask: How does aerospace power contribute to achieving political aims in wartime or peace? Today, we will discuss theories of airpower and emerging theories of space power.

E.3.e.1.b. The readings begin with extracts from three prominent airpower thinkers: Italian artillery officer Gulio Douhet, British Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard, and American airman Col John Warden. For each of these readings, pay attention to the underlying assumptions about how the new technology interacts with existing military forces, and what the authors assume about how any enemy society functions and how airpower can affect it.

E.3.e.1.c. The first reading is from Douhet. While often cited as one of airpower’s most prominent early theorists, one can make a good case that he is less influential than he is given credit for. The reading you have, extracted from *The Command of the Air*, emphasizes the criticality of maintaining control of this new domain if a modern nation is to survive a war. Douhet also makes stark predictions about the future position of airpower with respect to the traditional land and sea power branches.

E.3.e.1.d. The second primary reading is from Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard, one of airpower’s earliest senior commanders. He led the Royal Air Corps in World War One, and commanded the newly-independent Royal Air Force throughout the 1920s. In this reading, he lays out how he believes airpower would function in a future war. Like Douhet, he seeks a place for the new branch among the traditional ones, but as service chief, he frames a more collaborative argument.

E.3.e.1.e. The third primary reading is by a more modern airpower strategist, Col John Warden. Widely acknowledged as the author of the Desert Storm air campaign, *Instant Thunder*, he lays out his five-ring targeting methodology in this paper.

E.3.e.1.f. You will then read two chapters from Beatrice Heuser’s book, *The Evolution of Strategy*. She places the first three readings in a wider historical context including
naval strategy, and traces the development of several key airpower ideas. The first is
the concept of control of the air and its many variants. A second is deterrence of war
through a powerful air force. The final is the relationship between air forces and the
traditional military branches.

E.3.e.1.g. The second chapter from Heuser's book both expands the definitions
of airpower beyond the thinkers in the previous chapter and provides a scheme for
thinking about different forms of airpower theory. She identifies four schools of
airpower theory: strategic/city bombing, military targets, leadership targeting, and
political signaling. This chapter should indicate that in its short time as a military
instrument, airpower thought has developed rapidly and into many forms.

E.3.e.1.h. Finally, we will move from one form of global commons, air, to a second,
space. In the reading from Air University's space primer, the authors lay out the
linkages to airpower theory, and the development of early space theory. This reading
should reinforce for you the interconnected nature of strategic thinking and how it
evolves. To what extent is there a theory of "space power" that informs our thinking
about the potential use of assets located in low earth orbit and geosynchronous orbit?
Can we envision the space well above the earth as both a commons and a potential
zone of conflict and combat?

E.3.e.1.i. On completion of the readings, you should be able to identify some of the
key theorists of early aviation, and the arguments they put forward. Why did many of
them believe that long-range bombing would radically impact war? What claims did
they make? What social and political factors might have influenced their
assumptions? To what extent do these early assumptions influence contemporary
thinking about airpower?

E.3.e.1.j. As you discuss airpower as a coercive tool, realize that you must
understand and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of your adversary. You must
understand your adversary's domestic power structure, resource utilization, sources of
resilience and resistance, and civil-military relations.

E.3.e.1.k. Nearly all nations adopting aircraft as instruments of military power
struggled with who should own and control them. There was no simple answer to this
question, leading to a myriad of individual outcomes in different places. This struggle
was largely unavoidable since aircraft proved to be essential in many realms of
warfare. (The problem is not unlike the contemporary problem of cyber or space
assets today: they are extremely useful, so everyone wants them.)

E.3.e.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

E.3.e.2.a. Assess the roles of airpower in deterrence and in war fighting, with special
attention paid to continuities in airpower thought.

E.3.e.2.b. Describe the links between airpower, maritime, and spacepower theory.
E.3.e.2.c. Outline the essential elements underpinning the theories about aerial bombing as an independent coercive instrument. Describe how they were applied in the past, and where application revealed gaps between expectations and realities.

E.3.e.2.d. Describe emerging ideas and theories about the use of space (low earth orbit and geosynchronous orbit, LEO and GEO) and potential for conflict in space.

E.3.e.3. Student Requirements.

E.3.e.3.a. Tasks. None

E.3.e.3.b. Required Readings.


E.3.e.3.b.4. Beatrice Heuser, “Four Schools of Airpower.” In The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 313–50. [Blackboard]


E.3.e.3.c. Suggested Readings.


E.3.e.4. Points to Consider.

E.3.e.4.a. How have theories about the employment of airpower in war been shaped by the period in which they were created?

E.3.e.4.b. What qualities make an emerging domain of warfare distinct from others? To the extent that it can plausibly be the basis of a separate service?

E.3.e.4.c. What is the relationship between airpower theory and technological innovation?

E.3.e.4.d. Why does a strategist considering the coercive use of airpower need to know a lot about the domestic political and economic structure of an adversary?

E.3.e.4.e. Why does a strategist considering the coercive use of airpower need to know a lot about the domestic political and economic structure of an adversary?
E.3.f. **LESSON 13: NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND LIMITED WAR**

Col Ed Kaplan 12 September 2017
245-3341 0830-1130
Mode: Seminar TWS-13-S

E.3.f.1. Introduction.

E.3.f.1.a. The nuclear age produced new schools of theory in which nuclear weapons challenged the character of war and altered global power relationships. Even before the Soviet Union tested its first atomic weapon in 1949, scholars began debating these new destructive means. Each service tried to adapt their existing ways of war to include the new weapons, while a civilian strategic community, “Wizards of Armageddon” as Fred Kaplan called them, influenced U.S. policy and nuclear strategy. The ideas born in these debates influence strategic discussion to the present day, and subsequently migrated into non-nuclear theory. Some of these civilian theorists and strategists shared the optimistic belief that nuclear war could be limited or fought rationally, but alarm about a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union was another matter because of the dire consequences.

E.3.f.1.b. These scholars also reexamined Clausewitz’s famous maxim, “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means,” that emphasized that political objectives drive war’s conduct. Essentially, Clausewitz argued that all wars are limited by their very nature—otherwise they would escalate unavoidably to total commitment of all existing resources regardless of the objective. In limited war, at least one of adversary does not seek to totally destroy the other. Instead, war is bargaining. Through graduated military response, both sides seek a settlement short of annihilation. Other aspects of limited war are based on limitation of military effort, targeting restrictions, geographical boundaries, or the quantities and destructiveness of weaponry. However, these limitations are still commonly the result of the war’s political objective. As Clausewitz noted, “The political objective—the original motive for the war—will determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.”

E.3.f.1.c. Just a few years ago, some of the concepts found in nuclear strategy and related military doctrine were considered relics of the Cold War. In truth, nuclear strategy and limited war never went out of fashion. For example, leaders and strategists are rediscovering the importance of deterrence theory. Concepts such as legitimacy, escalation control, and assurance, are still important although their use is more subtle and has been modified to address specific challenges.

E.3.f.1.d. Today’s strategist must understand classical nuclear theory to develop concepts for 21st century challenges. The strategist can mine this rich literature for a better understanding of force and power and their application across the spectrum of conflict. There also has been considerable discussion among military officers and academics about limited war and nuclear escalation in South Asia and the Middle
East. Other current events suggest war can also be a model of limited confrontation between a non-state actor and a state, with the ensuing difficulty of defining, let alone achieving, objectives in this type of confrontation. These concepts are as pertinent today as they were for political and military leaders more than six decades ago.

E.3.f.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

E.3.f.2.a. Identify the evolutionary relationship between airpower and early nuclear strategy.

E.3.f.2.b. Distinguish the strategies associated with nuclear weapons developed in the Cold War era and assess their application to the contemporary security environment.

E.3.f.2.c. Analyze how a nuclear aspirant’s motives and strategic thinking lead to concerns about nuclear proliferation in the Second Nuclear Age.

E.3.f.2.d. Identify the theoretical foundations of limited war in the modern era, and assess the factors that may limit a conflict in terms of securing national interests.

E.3.f.3. Student Requirements.

E.3.f.3.a. Tasks. None

E.3.f.3.b. Required Readings.


E.3.f.3.c. Suggested Readings.


E.3.f.4. Points to Consider.

E.3.f.4.a. How does the factor of time influence the waging of limited war? Does time favor one party to the conflict over the other? What role does domestic public opinion have in keeping limited wars short?

E.3.f.4.b. To what degree are nuclear strategies and limited war strategies dependent on cool, rational calculation? What are the implications for this during a conflict?

E.3.f.4.c. Has technological advantage on the part of one of the parties in a limited war led to an overreliance on military means and a failure to set realistic political objectives?

E.3.f.4.d. What assumptions underlie the principles that Osgood espouses in his essay regarding the theory of limited war? How well does this theory explain the use of force in the Persian Gulf War (1991) that you studied in the Introduction to Strategic Studies course?

E.3.f.4.e. How does miscalculation of the enemy’s intent affect the conduct of limited war? Do mistaken calculations and assessments weaken deterrence as the principal theory underlying limited war?
E.3.f.4.f. How does public opinion (domestic and international) as well as international norms (e.g., legitimacy, international law) affect the waging of limited war? Are these factors a constraint on how political and military leaders devise their strategy and how they employ weaponry?

E.3.f.4.g. How does Sun Tzu’s maxim that knowing your enemy as a path to victory relate to the bargaining and signaling aspects of limited war theory? How does strategic culture influence these aspects of limited war theory?

E.3.f.4.h. Could a massive nuclear exchange accomplish a political purpose other than retaliation? What are the ethical dilemmas of using nuclear weapons associated with retaliation or first use?

E.3.f.4.i. What is the role of nuclear weapons as a deterrent in the current international security environment?
E.3.g. LESSON 14: WAR AMONG THE PEOPLES: PEOPLE’S WAR, INSURGENCY, COIN, AND TERRORISM

Dr. Christian B. Keller
245-3176
Mode: Seminar

14 September 2017
0830-1130
TWS-14-S

E.3.g.1. Introduction.

E.3.g.1.a. Clausewitz’s famous maxim, “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means,” emphasizes that political objectives shape the conduct of war. Indeed, Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (March 2013) implicitly recognizes one of Clausewitz’s definitions of war noting that: “War is socially sanctioned violence to achieve a political purpose.” However, some observers, such as Martin Van Creveld, John Keegan, or proponents of 4th Generation Warfare, like William Lind and T. X. Hammes suggest that Clausewitz’s ideas apply only to conventional state versus state wars, and that the significant presence and influence of non-state actors in insurgencies, guerrilla wars, and terrorism may have reduced the contemporary relevance of the Prussian philosopher of war.

E.3.g.1.b. An overarching question for this lesson, therefore, regards how Clausewitz’s ideas may apply to contemporary small wars, insurgencies, and COIN. We begin by revisiting the writings of the Prussian himself. His chapter in On War entitled “The People in Arms” provides insights into his theoretical intent regarding these non-conventional wars.

E.3.g.1.c. Next, we will examine guerrilla warfare, insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, and terrorism, all of which may be classified under the rubric of irregular warfare. Irregular warfare is as old as war itself, as Max Boot points out. The addition of a nationalistic element during the French Revolution and a set of theoretical writings in the Twentieth Century turned a tactical technique into a strategic way. Strategists must understand the theories that underlie insurgencies, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism before developing effective counter-strategies. Strategists also must understand that not all irregular wars are limited in their character, especially from the perspective of the irregular fighter or insurgent.

E.3.g.1.d. Irregular warfare, and especially counterinsurgency warfare, is not easy. This is particularly true when guerrilla warfare is the technique used by an efficiently organized, politically or ideologically motivated, and effectively led group of dedicated insurgents. Such was the case for Chinese insurgent leader—and later Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party—Mao Zedong Successful insurgents (those who last long enough to cause major problems for states) tend to be more than simply armies of the disaffected. They invariably have some political, ideological, or religious grievance that strikes enough of a chord in the minds of the population in which they operate to generate at least neutrality, if not support. Effective insurgent movements tend to be tactically ruthless, seek more unlimited strategic ends compared to their
adversaries (such as the overthrow of a state), and frequently do not feel bound by the same set of rules by which the government operates. This gives insurgents a certain freedom of choice and makes available types of actions (like kidnappings, torture, summary executions, or terrorism) that a state fighting an insurgency cannot adopt without losing its most basic advantage—legitimacy. Insurgents usually operate in small groups in complex terrain and are difficult to locate, and increasingly are adept at using technology to their advantage (such as ISIL’s use of the internet). Intelligence is at a premium in a counterinsurgency; it is also difficult to obtain when the insurgents are even modestly competent. As Anthony Joes points out, successful prosecution of irregular war by either insurgents or counterinsurgents requires patience, motivation, strong leadership, popular support, and, most significantly, good political and military strategy.

E.3.g.1.e. Finally, in this lesson we will analyze John Lynn’s theories on terrorism, one of the subcategories of irregular war that so often besets the current global order and against which the United States and its allies have been fighting for decades. Lynn argues that terrorists not only attempt to instill fear to achieve their political objectives, but also a sense of moral outrage in the targeted states’ populations in order to provoke an overreaction that could have far-reaching strategic implications. In an era of shrinking means and ever-expanding ends, his argument bears greater scrutiny.

E.3.g.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

E.3.g.2.a. Analyze the theory of people’s war according to Carl von Clausewitz and guerrilla warfare according to Mao Zedong.

E.3.g.2.b. Analyze the nature and strategies of insurgencies in their historical and contemporary contexts.

E.3.g.2.c. Analyze the nature and strategies of counter-insurgencies in their historical and contemporary contexts.

E.3.g.2.d. Outline the strengths and weaknesses of terrorism as a tool for irregular warfare and insurgencies.

E.3.g.3. Student Requirements.

E.3.g.3.a. Tasks. None.

E.3.g.3.b. Required Readings.


[Student Issue]


E.3.g.3.b.3. Anthony J. Joes, “Prologue: Guerrilla Insurgency as a Political Problem” and “Guerrilla Strategy and Tactics,” in *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2006), 1-23. [Blackboard]


E.3.g.3.b.5. Max Boot, “The Evolution of Irregular War: Insurgents and Guerrillas from Akkadai to Afghanistan,” *Foreign Affairs* 92, no. 2 (March-April 2013): 100-114. [Blackboard]


E.3.g.3.c. Suggested Readings.


E.3.g.4. Points to Consider.

E.3.g.4.a. How does Clausewitz define “people’s war” and its nature?

E.3.g.4.b. How does Mao define guerrilla war and its nature?

E.3.g.4.c. What commonalities exist among irregular wars of the past and present? What has changed?

E.3.g.4.d. What is the relationship between people’s war/guerrilla warfare and political goals in Clausewitz’s and Mao’s theories? According to Anthony Joes? Is Maoist doctrine still applicable for insurgents in the modern world?

E.3.g.4.e. Is there such a thing as a bona fide “guerrilla strategy” or “irregular strategy?” How has the concept of a successful insurgency changed over time?

E.3.g.4.f. Do you agree with Joes’ assessment of what makes an insurgency successful or not, particularly his assertion that factors intrinsic to the state (geography, government effectiveness) are the primary determinants?

E.3.g.4.g. Is terrorism a useful tool in a peoples’ war? What risks are inherent for modern states fighting terrorism?
E.3.h. LESSON 15: VICTORY AND CONFLICT TERMINATION

Dr. Jacqueline Whitt
245-3292
Mode: Seminar

E.3.h.1. Introduction.

E.3.h.1.a. Over the course of TWS, we have studied the nature and definition of war and strategy, how wars begin, and how they are fought. Today’s lesson, then, brings us to the end of this narrative arc to examine how wars end. The lesson deals with questions of defining victory (or defeat) in war and the specific challenges of war termination and conflict resolution at the strategic level. If strategy is, fundamentally, instrumental—that is, applying resources to achieving ends—then the strategist must be concerned with defining and achieving victory at every level of war: tactical, operational, strategic, and political.

E.3.h.1.b. This lesson will allow you to explore several notions about the end of wars in some depth. First, we seem to know, almost intuitively, that getting out of wars is a great deal more complicated than getting into them. Second, we confront Clausewitz’s observation from On War that “In war, the result is never final” (p. 80). Third, we should wrestle with the fact that a war’s aims or ends may change over time—that the articulated objectives at the beginning of a war may expand or contract as the war is fought. Fourth, we must understand the interplay between the military and political aspects of war and between the physical and psychological aspects of the same.

E.3.h.1.c. The readings for today include two foundational and somewhat abstract or theoretical readings. The first, an article by J. Boone Bartholomew, makes a case for defining a “theory of victory” and explores some of the temporal, psychological, and physical aspects of victory. The second reading, from Fred Iklé’s book Every War Must End, asks why states encounter such difficulty when trying to end wars—when wars are among the most costly endeavors a state can undertake. These readings should help orient your thinking to the broad themes listed above and contained in the “points to consider” below.

E.3.h.1.d. The last two readings provide case studies on which to test and apply the theoretical readings.

E.3.h.1.d.1. The first is a case study of war-termination dynamics in the Korean War from Dan Reiter’s book, How Wars End. As this case study is a chapter from a book that makes a broader argument, defining two key propositions Reiter uses in his analysis will aid in your understanding of the material.

E.3.h.1.d.1.a. Information proposition – Reiter is writing from a rationalist framework to understand war and strategic decisions. In the “bargaining model,” wars break out because of a dispute over the distribution of a good (e.g., land, resources, prestige,
etc.), an underlying disagreement about the relative balance of power between the two sides, and uncertainty about the outcome of a war. In this model, battles or combat provide the belligerents more information to settle these disagreements—which military force is stronger, which side has the greater will, which side is more effective, etc. Thus, the “information proposition” suggests: “following a combat success, a belligerent will raise its war-termination offer (demand more); however, following a combat defeat, a belligerent will lower its war-termination offer (demand less)” (How Wars End, p. 16)

E.3.h.1.d.1.b. Credible Commitment proposition – Reiter's second proposition concerns the behavior of belligerents after a war-termination agreement is reached. The bargaining model of war, borrowed from economics, assumes compliance with agreements, but we know that in the arena of international relations that compliance is neither automatic nor guaranteed. The act of fighting a war further degrades trust between belligerents, and it is rarely in a state’s interest to assume their adversary will simply comply with a war-termination agreement. Thus, the “credible commitment proposition” suggests: “the more a belligerent fears its adversary will violate war-ending commitments, the more likely that belligerent will be to pursue “absolute victory” including annihilation, state death, occupation, or forced regime-change (How Wars End, p. 31).

E.3.h.1.d.2. The second case study by Audrey Kurth Cronin is more contemporary and examines the idea of “winning” the Global War on Terror, and more specifically, the war against al Qaeda. This case study expands the aperture of the lesson to consider non-state actors and unconventional or hybrid wars, whereas most of the theoretical literature on war termination tends to focus on conventional and state-based war.

E.3.h.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, students should be able to:

E.3.h.2.a. Evaluate the distinction between “victory” and “winning” (or “defeat” and “losing”) at the strategic level.

E.3.h.2.b. Analyze rational and irrational factors that contribute to war termination dynamics.

E.3.h.2.c. Assess the reasons that states struggle with ending wars, conflict-resolution, and developing exit strategies.

E.3.h.2.d. Compare the challenges of war termination and conflict resolution across various types of war, to include conventional, hybrid, and unconventional war as well as wars with total and limited aims.

E.3.h.3. Student Requirements.

E.3.h.3.a. Tasks. None
E.3.h.3.b. Required Readings.


E.3.h.3.c. Suggested Readings.


E.3.h.4. Points to Consider.
E.3.h.4.a. What does it mean to “win” (or lose) a war? What is the difference Bartholomees makes between “victory” and “winning” or between “losing” and “defeat”? Could both sides win (or lose) a war? Are these distinctions helpful?

E.3.h.4.b. Is there a temporal aspect to victory (or defeat) in war? How do strategists determine when a war is over? How long does a war termination agreement (formal or informal) have to last for its results to declare victory (or defeat)?

E.3.h.4.c. How and why do war termination criteria change over time? How do changing conditions at the tactical and operational levels of war affect strategic decisions about ending a war?

E.3.h.4.d. Why does it seem easier to start wars than to end them? Why does it seem that strategists often fail to plan for the end of wars?

E.3.h.4.e. How do information and commitment problems affect war-termination and conflict-resolution decisions at the strategic level? Can you apply these insights from Reiter’s work to the problems of war termination and conflict-resolution in the Global War on Terror?

E.3.h.4.f. What is the relationship between military and political ends in war? Can a belligerent achieve “military victory, but political defeat” or vice versa?

E.3.h.4.g. What is the relationship between war initiation and war termination—that is, how wars start and how they end? In what cases might war termination lead to future war initiation?

E.3.h.4.h. To what extent do war-termination and conflict-resolution dynamics vary depending on the type of war being fought—state v. non-state, hybrid, total, conventional, unconventional, cyber, nuclear, limited, etc.
E.3.i.1. Introduction.

E.3.i.1.a. Assessing continuity and change within war and warfare has been a centuries-long task. Indeed, attempting to discern the truly new from the simply unfamiliar to the contemporary observer has been a recurring tension throughout the Theory of War and Strategy Course. Thus, it is only fitting that the final lesson of TWS should focus on the question of the degree of continuity or change some might envisage in the future of warfare and strategy.

E.3.i.1.b. Such analysis hinges, of course, on what the future may hold. Here the strategist rarely is on firm ground. As one senior leader once observed in Bliss Hall, “the foreseeable future isn’t really foreseeable.” In a more critical vein, former Secretary of Defense, Dr. Robert Gates oftentimes remarked that when it comes to predicting the future with precision, we have 100 percent accuracy—we have gotten zero right. Nor are contemporary observers alone in this regard. Throughout history, people failed to foresee significant historical events, such as the French Revolution, World War I, the Great Depression, or, in our own times, the events of September 11, 2001.

E.3.i.1.c. Despite the challenges of doing so, strategists and policymakers still must learn to think about the future in order to plan and prepare. While we are unlikely to get the future completely “right,” that should not be our goal. Instead, to paraphrase the historian Sir Michael Howard’s comment about doctrine, we just should not be too far wrong.

E.3.i.1.d. To that end, this lesson will help you think about how (and how not) to conceptualize the future. One way is to look backwards. As the expression goes, new things are only old things happening to new people. Put slightly differently, if a pattern has been true since the time of Thucydides, it is likely to remain true for the near term. This does not infer that nothing changes. However, it does mean placing the burden of proof on those individuals predicting that some technology or political movement will cause radical change to the nature and character of war and strategy. The first reading, a short essay from Colin Gray, a prolific and oftentimes controversial, contemporary strategist, offers some observations on continuity and change in contemporary strategy.

E.3.i.1.e. Another way to think about the future is to look forward. Thus, this lesson offers for your consideration several emerging theories, concepts, doctrines, and practices that hold potential to alter the future character of war: the so-called “gray
zone” phenomenon, Russia’s “new type war,” China’s military strategy, the differing uses of terrorism by Al Qaida and ISIL, and, potentially the most disrupting influence of all, cyber warfare.

E.3.i.1.f. Whether looking backward or forward, assess how these ideas might influence the character of war and strategy in the near-, mid-, and long-term. Examine critically, the question of continuity versus change. As you do so, draw upon insights from throughout the TWS course, particularly, your study of the fundamental principles of strategy. Where possible, clearly discriminate between the truly new, and “old wine in new bottles.”

E.3.i.2. Learning Outcomes. By the end of the lesson, the student should be able to:

E.3.i.2.a. Assess the challenges that strategists face when trying to develop plans for the future.

E.3.i.2.b. Evaluate the utility of the theorists and strategists we have studied so far (Thucydides, Clausewitz, etc.) in helping strategists determine the enduring nature of strategy.

E.3.i.2.c. Evaluate the usefulness of emerging concepts and theories on the future character of war and strategy.

E.3.i.3. Student Requirements

E.3.i.3.a. Tasks. None

E.3.i.3.b. Required Readings.


E.3.i.3.c. Suggested Readings.


E.3.i.4. Points to Consider.

E.3.i.4.a. Colin Gray asserts “... that enormous changes in the tactical and operational grammar of strategy matter not at all for the nature and function of war and strategy.” Do you agree with his contention? Why or why not?

E.3.i.4.b. How can strategists prepare for an uncertain future? How can they prepare for a variety of threats? What are the potential consequences for strategy of more intra-state rather than inter-state wars? How might strategies of conflict affect the application of military power?

E.3.i.4.c. Has warfare remained primarily Clausewitzian (determined by the interplay of violence, chance, and reason) or has it become non-Clausewitzian as critics claim? Or, is it something else entirely?

E.3.i.4.d. What is the relationship between technology/science and warfare? How might changes in this relationship affect the nature, character, or characteristics of war?

E.3.i.4.e. Is strategy an art, a science, or does it contain elements of both? How does one’s understanding of the nature of strategy influence how wars are fought and won?
F. APPENDIX I

WRITING A GUIDED RESPONSE PAPER: REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES

F.1. General. The first writing requirement for the Theory of War and Strategy (TWS) course is a guided response paper of 3-4 pages (excluding front matter and endnotes). The requirement is called a guided response paper because you will respond to a set of questions using critical analysis of Thucydides’ *The Peloponnesian War* as the principal source. The paper will be due on 30 August 2017.

F.2. Purpose. This TWS paper seeks to enhance your ability to think critically and analytically. This requirement also seeks to make you a more careful and attentive reader. Both of these skills are vital for those who hold senior positions or to the individuals who advise them.

F.3. Requirement. You have read Thucydides and have examined his views on war, policy, and strategy as they relate to the Peloponnesian War. For this paper, you will respond to one of the following sets of questions.

F.3.a. Using the ends-ways-means-risk construct, identify and analyze the evolution of Athenian (or Spartan) strategy from inception through conclusion of the war. Specifically, how much did Athenian (or Spartan) strategy change, and why? How did Athens (or Sparta) adapt its strategy as the realities, risks, and length of the war changed, and why?

F.3.b. Using the ends-ways-means-risk construct, analyze the development of the strategy for the Athenian expedition to Sicily. How well did Athenian leaders formulate their objectives in light of their national interest and the means available to them at the time? How successfully did their ways support achieving those objectives? Were the means adequate? How well did Athenian leaders evaluate risk?

F.4. Formatting. Use the REP AY18 Seminar Paper Template (USAwc Home Page/Students-KM/ Communicative Arts or https://internal.carlisle.army.mil/sites/Communicative_Arts/default.aspx). Section headings, introductory quotations, and other material that consume space without conveying information are discouraged. Ensure your name is in the header of each page, and that you number all pages. Print only on one side if submitting a hard copy. For other specific information regarding format, to include page numbering, punctuation spacing, and paragraph indentation, see the “Formatting” section of the Communicative Arts Directive.

F.5. Evidence and Documentation. Although this paper is not a research paper, you must support your points with good evidence. While not required to use any other source beyond Thucydides’ *The Peloponnesian War*, you may use other course readings and outside sources (see the suggested readings for Lessons 2-4). If you
quote directly from Thucydides’ text or use thoughts that are not your own, such as paraphrasing Thucydides or borrowing from another’s article or book, then use endnotes to cite your source. Use the endnote format in the Communicative Arts Directive. (See the “Guide to Writing and Researching for Strategic Leaders” and the “Endnote Citation Format” sections of the directive for detailed information.) Failure to document appropriately is plagiarism.

F.6. Evaluation. In general, your faculty instructor will evaluate your paper in accordance with the criteria in “Assessment of Student Work--Written Work” section of the Communicative Arts Directive. Successful completion of this requirement demonstrates a student’s capacity to analyze, refine, evaluate, and synthesize material in a coherent and persuasive manner. More specifically,

F.6.a. A “meets standards” paper must first address the specific questions asked. Answers to those questions must be clear, coherent, and logical. Responses carefully integrate information from Thucydides and appropriately document that information. Analysis stems from evidence, and conclusions flow logically from the analysis. Answers have a clear beginning, middle, and end. Writing style is clear, concise, and generally free of grammatical, punctuation, and typographical errors. In a professional vein, “meets standards” indicates that the paper is suitable for review by a flag officer.

F.6.b. An “exceeds standards” paper must address all the requirements of a “meets standards” paper,” and more. The paper demonstrates a superior grasp of the material. Analysis offers deeper insights into the questions posed. The proposed response integrates and synthesizes across all subordinate questions, offering a coherent whole. The paper integrates and synthesizes differing perspectives. The paper reflects appropriate documentation. Clarity and concise thought mark the paper. The organization of the paper flows logically and smoothly from theme to theme. The writer displays a command of the written word, and the paper is free of grammatical, punctuation, and typographical errors.

F.6.c. An “outstanding” paper exemplifies excellence in written communication. The paper reflects broad and compelling evidence that is appropriately documented. Analysis routinely includes differing perspectives or discussion of contrary evidence. An outstanding paper demonstrates integration and synthesis of evidence that leads to well-founded conclusions. The organization carries the reader along effortlessly. Writing style is clear, coherent, and concise. The paper does not contain spelling, grammar, or typographical errors.

F.6.d. Papers that receive an overall grade of “needs improvement” or “fails to meet standards” will be resubmitted according to directions from your FI until “meets standards” has been achieved. Generally, an evaluation of needs improvement will result in academic probation until the rewrite meets standards.
G. APPENDIX II

WRITING AN ANALYTICAL PAPER: REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES

G.1. General. The second writing requirement for the Theory of War and Strategy (TWS) course is a 5-6 page analytical paper that allows a student to communicate her or his understanding of the course objectives, outcomes, and content. Key dates for the paper include:


G.1.b. The paper is due on 18 September 2017.

G.2. Purpose. The purpose of this TWS paper is to further your ability to think critically and analytically about war and strategy.

G.3. Requirement. Students will write an analytical paper on one of the following questions or topics:

G.3.a. “What strategic theory or theorist do you believe best explains the nature and character of war in the Twenty-First Century?”

G.3.b. “Apply one or more strategic theories to a specific national security challenge currently facing the United States or its allies.” Students may refine that basic question, if desired, but must do so in coordination with the FI. Students considering modifying the topic question in any manner should not begin their papers until the FI has specifically approved the modification.

G.4. Formatting. Use the REP AY18 Seminar Paper Template (USAWC Home Page/Students-KM/ Communicative Arts or https://internal.carlisle.army.mil/sites/Communicative_Arts/default.aspx ). Section headings, introductory quotations, and other material that consume space without conveying information are discouraged. Ensure your name is in the header of each page, and that you number all pages. Print only on one side if submitting a hard copy. For other specific information regarding formation to include page numbering punctuation spacing, and paragraph indentation, see the “Formatting” section of the Communicative Arts Directive.

G.5. Evidence and Documentation.

G.5.a. Your TWS readings offer a start point for your research; however, this paper will require additional, outside research to explore specific theories/theorists in more detail. The paper should present a clear and logical argument supported by authoritative sources. (Wikipedia, for example, is not an authoritative source.) The suggested readings for appropriate lessons offer ideas for more detailed examination of the theories/theorists. In addition, your FI can recommend sources.
G.5.b. Once your research is complete, you must analyze and synthesize that research into a clear, concise, and logical presentation.

G.5.c. You must document information used in your analysis, such as ideas, facts, data, or other materials derived directly from, or inspired by, the work of someone else. This includes not only quotations, but also paraphrasing of another’s ideas or thoughts. The “Rules for Writing and Research” section of the Communicative Arts Directive provides useful information as well as documentation policies and some example citations. Failure to document appropriately is plagiarism.

G.6. Evaluation. In general, your FI will evaluate the paper in accordance with the criteria in “Assessment of Student Work--Written Work” section of the Communicative Arts Directive. Successful completion of this requirement demonstrates a student’s ability to evaluate and synthesize the material presented in the course in a coherent and persuasive manner. More specifically,

G.6.a. While it is possible to answer topic question 3a in one sentence that, of course, would not meet standards. You must explain and support your selection. This is a two-part task. First, you must describe what you believe to be the nature and character of war in the Twenty-First Century. You also will need to provide evidence and analysis to support your views. Second, using the ideas of one or more strategic theorists or strategists, you must explain why you believe your selected individual(s) is (are) most relevant to your conclusions about the nature and character of war. You might also discuss the reasons for rejecting other theories or theorists who you believe are not applicable to the strategic environment in which warfare will occur.

G.6.b. Topic 3b is a different, but related, task of two parts. First, you must identify and outline a pertinent national security challenge. Possible national security issues might include, but are not limited to: the continuing war against terror; the future of U.S.-China relations; North Korean threats and aggression; cyber-attacks on national security networks and infrastructure; Russian nationalism; the future of NATO; intervention in Syria; and global climate change. Your FI should approve the specific issue as part of your topic selection. Second, you must apply one or more strategic theories to analyze your chosen national security challenge. This supporting argument should include direct analysis, synthesis, and evaluation of key concepts addressed in the course.

G.6.c. Regardless of topic, a “meets standards” paper must address the chosen topic. The paper must have a clear and unambiguous thesis. The paper must offer substantive evidence that supports the stated thesis. The paper must appropriately document the sources of the evidence per the Communicative Arts Directive. Analysis must be clear, coherent, and logical. Conclusions flow logically from the analysis. The paper, paragraphs, and sentences have a clear beginning, middle, and end. Writing style is clear, concise, and generally free of grammatical, punctuation, and
typographical errors. In a professional vein, “meets standards” indicates that the 
paper is suitable for review by a flag officer.

G.6.d. An “exceeds standards” paper must address all the requirements of a “meets 
standards” paper, and more. The paper demonstrates a superior grasp of the 
material. Analysis offers deeper insights into the topic. The analysis integrates and 
synthesizes evidence, offering a comprehensive treatment of the material. The paper 
acknowledges and reconciles competing or differing viewpoints. The paper reflects 
appropriate documentation. Clarity and concise thought mark the paper. The 
organization of the paper flows logically and smoothly from theme to theme. The 
writer displays a command of the written word, and the paper is free of grammatical, 
punctuation, and typographical errors.

G.6.e. An “outstanding” paper exemplifies excellence in written communication. The 
paper reflects broad, compelling, and appropriately documented evidence. Analysis 
routinely includes differing perspectives or discussion of contrary evidence. An 
outstanding paper demonstrates integration and synthesis of evidence that leads to 
well-founded conclusions. The organization carries the reader along effortlessly. 
Writing style is clear, coherent, and concise. The paper does not contain spelling, 
grammar, or typographical errors.

G.6.f. Papers that receive an overall grade of “needs improvement” or “fails to meet 
standards” will be resubmitted according to directions from your FI until “meets 
standards” has been achieved. Generally, an evaluation of “needs improvement” or 
“fails to meet standards” will result in academic probation until the rewrite meets 
standards.
H. APPENDIX III

SCHOOL OF STRATEGIC LANDPOWER PROGRAM LEARNING OUTCOMES

H.1. Mission. The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application of Landpower.

H.2. Institutional Learning Outcomes (ILOs). Our graduates are intellectually prepared to preserve peace, deter aggression, and, when necessary, achieve victory in war. In pursuit of these goals, they study and confer on the great problems of national defense, military science, and responsible command.

H.2.a. Achieving this objective requires proficiency in four domains of knowledge:

H.2.a.1. Theory of war and peace

H.2.a.2. U.S. national security policy, processes, and management

H.2.a.3. Military strategy and unified theater operations

H.2.a.4. Command and leadership

H.2.b. And the ability and commitment to:

H.2.b.1. Think critically, creatively, and strategically.

H.2.b.2. Frame national security challenges in their historical, social, political, and economic contexts.

H.2.b.3. Promote a military culture that reflects the values and ethic of the Profession of Arms.

H.2.b.4. Listen, read, speak, and write effectively.

H.2.b.5. Advance the intellectual, moral, and physical development of oneself and one's subordinates.

H.3. Program Learning Outcomes (PLOs) The School of Strategic Landpower (SSL) establishes PLOs that delineate critical fields of knowledge and appropriate jurisdictions of practice for our students to master. The core competence of our graduates is leadership in the global application of strategic land power. To accomplish this mission, SSL presents a curriculum designed to produce graduates who can:
H.3.a. Evaluate theories of war and strategy in the context of national security decision making.

H.3.b. Analyze, adapt, and develop military processes, organizations, and capabilities to achieve national defense objectives.

H.3.c. Apply strategic and operational art to develop strategies and plans that employ the military instrument of power in pursuit of national aims.

H.3.d. Evaluate the nature, concepts, and components of strategic leadership and synthesize their responsible application.

H.3.e. Think critically and creatively in addressing security issues at the strategic level.

H.3.f. Communicate clearly, persuasively, and candidly.
I. APPENDIX IV

SERVICE SENIOR-LEVEL COLLEGE JOINT LEARNING AREAS AND OBJECTIVES (JPME-II)

I.1. Overview. Service SLCs develop strategic leaders who can think critically and apply military power in support of national objectives in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment. Service War Colleges hone student expertise and competency on their respective Service's roles, missions, and principal operating domains and focus on integrating them into the joint force, unfettered by Service parochialism across the range of military operations.

I.2. Mission. Each Service SLC is unique in mission and functional support. However, a fundamental objective of each is to prepare future military and civilian leaders for high-level policy, command and staff responsibilities requiring joint and Service operational expertise and warfighting skills by educating them on the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military and economic), the strategic security environment and the effect those instruments have on strategy formulation, implementation, and campaigning. The goal is to develop agile and adaptive leaders with the requisite values, strategic vision, and thinking skills to keep pace with the changing strategic environment. SLC subject matter is inherently joint; JPME at this level focuses on the immersion of students in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment and completes educational requirements for JQO (level 3) nomination.

I.3. Learning Area 1 – National Strategies

I.3.a. Apply key strategic concepts, critical thinking, and analytical frameworks to formulate and execute strategy.

I.3.b. Analyze the integration of all instruments of national power in complex, dynamic, and ambiguous environments to attain objectives at the national and theater-strategic levels.

I.3.c. Evaluate historical and/or contemporary security environments and applications of strategies across the range of military operations.

I.3.d. Apply strategic security policies, strategies, and guidance used in developing plans across the range of military operations and domains to support national objectives.

I.3.e. Evaluate how the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. Force structure affect the development and implementation of security, defense, and military strategies.

I.4.a. Evaluate the principles of joint operations, joint military doctrine, joint functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment), and emerging concepts across the range of military operations.

I.4.b. Evaluate how theater strategies, campaigns, and major operations achieve national strategic goals across the range of military operations.

I.4.c. Apply an analytical framework that addresses the factors politics, geography, society, culture, and religion play in shaping the desired outcomes of policies, strategies, and campaigns.

I.4.d. Analyze the role of OCS in supporting Service capabilities and joint functions to meet strategic objectives considering the effects contracting and contracted support have on the operational environment.

I.4.e. Evaluate how strategic level plans anticipate and respond to surprise, uncertainty, and emerging conditions.

I.4.f. Evaluate key classical, contemporary, and emerging concepts, including IO and cyberspace operations, doctrine and traditional/irregular approaches to war.

I.5. Learning Area 3 - National and Joint Planning Systems and Processes for the Integration of JIIM Capabilities.

I.5.a. Analyze how DoD, interagency and intergovernmental structures, processes, and perspectives reconcile, integrate, and apply national ends, ways and means.

I.5.b. Analyze the operational planning and resource allocation processes.

I.5.c. Evaluate the integration of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities, including all Service and Special Operations Forces, in campaigns across the range of military operations in achieving strategic objectives.

I.5.d. Value a joint perspective and appreciate the increased power available to commanders through joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational efforts.

I.5.e. Analyze the likely attributes of the future joint force and the challenges faced to plan, organize, prepare, conduct, and assess operations.

I.6.a. Evaluate the strategic-level options available in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment.

I.6.b. Analyze the factors of Mission Command as it relates to mission objectives, forces, and capabilities that support the selection of a command and control option.

I.6.c. Analyze the opportunities and challenges affecting command and control created in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment across the range of military operations, to include leveraging networks and technology.

I.7. Learning Area 5 - Strategic Leadership and the Profession of Arms.

I.7.a. Evaluate the skills, character attributes, and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational strategic environment.

I.7.b. Evaluate the skills, character attributes, and behaviors needed to lead in a dynamic joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational strategic environment.

I.7.c. Evaluate how strategic leaders develop innovative organizations capable of operating in dynamic, complex, and uncertain environments; anticipate change; and respond to surprise and uncertainty.

I.7.d. Evaluate how strategic leaders communicate a vision; challenge assumptions; and anticipate, plan, implement, and lead strategic change in complex joint or combined organizations.

I.7.e. Evaluate how strategic leaders communicate a vision; challenge assumptions; and anticipate, plan, implement, and lead strategic change in complex joint or combined organizations.

I.7.f. Evaluate how strategic leaders foster responsibility, accountability, selflessness and trust in complex joint or combined organizations.

I.7.g. Evaluate how strategic leaders establish and sustain an ethical climate among joint and combined forces, and develop/preserve public trust with their domestic citizenry.
J. APPENDIX V

AY18 THEMES

J.1. ENDURING THEMES Elihu Root’s challenge provides the underpinnings for enduring themes within the USAWC curriculum. The enduring themes stimulate intellectual growth by providing continuity and perspective as we analyze contemporary issues.

J.1.a. STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP AND THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETIONARY JUDGMENT.

J.1.a.1. Evaluate leadership at the strategic level (national security policy and strategy, especially in war)

J.1.a.2. Understand the profession’s national security clients and its appropriate jurisdictions of practice

J.1.a.3. Evaluate leadership of large, national security organizations.

J.1.a.4. Evaluate strategic thinking about the future (2nd and 3rd order effects)

J.1.a.5 Analyze the framework for leadings and managing strategic change, specifically the components of organizational change and the process by which organizations change.

J.1.b. RELATIONSHIP OF POLICY AND STRATEGY (RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENDS, WAYS, AND MEANS).

J.1.b.1. Analyze how to accomplish national security aims to win wars.

J.1.b.2 Analyze how to connect military actions to larger policy aims

J.1.b.3. Analyze how to resource national security

J.1.b.4. Evaluate international relations as the context for national security

J.1.c. INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER AND POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATIONAL SECURITY.

J.1.c.1. Comprehend Diplomatic Power

J.1.c.2. Comprehend Informational power

J.1.c.3. Evaluate Military Power
J.1.c.4. Comprehend Economic power

J.1.d. PROFESSIONAL ETHICS.

J.1.d.1. Evaluate the ethics of military operations (to include jus in bello and post bello)

J.1.d.2. Evaluate the ethics of war and the use of force (to include jus ad bello)

J.1.d.3. Evaluate the ethics of service to society (domestic civil-military relations)

J.1.e. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS.

J.1.e.1. Evaluate relationships between military and civilian leadership

J.1.e.2. Evaluate relationships between the military and domestic society

J.1.e.3. Evaluate relationships between armed forces and foreign populations

J.1.f. INSTRUMENTS OF WAR AND NATIONAL SECURITY.

J.1.f.1 Joint: Evaluate the capabilities and domains of joint forces (especially land, maritime, air, space, cyber)

J.1.f.2. Interagency: Understand other U.S. government agencies and departments

J.1.f.3. Intergovernmental; Understand potential relationships with other national governments

J.1.f.4. Multinational: Understand potential relationships with armed forces or agencies of other nations/coalition partners

J.1.g. HISTORY AS A VEHICLE FOR UNDERSTANDING STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES AND CHOICES.

J.1.g.1. Identify and analyze relevant historical examples of strategic leadership and strategic choices (across time and around the world)

J.1.g.2. Evaluate historical examples relevant to war and other national security endeavors

J.2. ENDURING LANDPOWER THEME (BY CORE COURSE) Theories of War and Strategy: Evaluate Armies/landpower as instruments of war. Evaluate relative decisiveness and adaptability of landpower as it affects the control of people, territory, and resources.
K. APPENDIX VI

K.1. OFFSITE ACCESS TO COURSE READINGS AND LIBRARY DATABASES.

K.1.a. EZproxy - Enables access to licensed database content when you are not in Root Hall. It operates as an intermediary server between your computer and the Library's subscription databases.

K.1.b. Links - You will find EZproxy links to full text readings in online syllabi, directives, bibliographies, reading lists, and emails so that you can easily access course materials anytime, anywhere. Providing links to online resources ensures that we comply with copyright law and saves money on the purchase of copyright permissions.

K.1.c. Library Databases – When you are away, you can use EZproxy to access databases. Go to the Library’s webpage at http://usawc.libguides.com/current and click on any database in the Library Databases column, such as ProQuest, EBSCO OmniFile, or FirstSearch. A blue screen will display. Then use your EZproxy username and password to login.

K.1.d. Username and Password - From home, when you click on a link that was built using EZproxy, or if you are trying to access a particular subscription database, a blue screen will prompt you to enter a username and password. You only need to do this once per session. You will find EZproxy login information on the wallet-size card you were given by the Library. If you have misplaced yours, just ask at the Access Services Desk for another card, contact us by phoning (717) 245-4288, or send email to: AskRoot@usawc.libanswers.com. You can also access the username and password from the USAWC Portal, Please do not share your EZproxy login information with others.

K.1.e. Impact of Firewalls - Most Internet service providers (ISPs) do not limit the areas you can access on the Internet, so home users should not encounter problems with firewalls. However, corporate sites often do employ firewalls and may be highly restrictive in what their employees can access, which can impede EZproxy.

K.2. ACCESS SOLUTIONS

K.2.a. Try Again! - Many problems with EZproxy are caused simply by login errors. If your first login attempt fails, try again. Check to make sure the Caps Lock is not on. Or, if you see a Page Not Found message after you do login, use the Back button and click on the link again. It may work the second time.

K.2.b. Broken Link - If a link appears to be broken, you can locate the article by using the appropriate database instead. Go to the Library’s webpage at www.carlisle.army.mil/library and click on Search the Library and Archives tab to retrieve the main menu at http://usawc.libguides.com/current/ Then click on the
database name, and type in the first four-five words in the title within quotation marks, hit ENTER.

K.2.c. Browsers - EZproxy works independently from operating systems and browsers, but your browser may cause problems if you have not downloaded and installed the newest version. Also, it is a good idea to check to make sure that the security settings on your browser are not too restrictive and that it will accept cookies and allow popups. Be aware ISPs that use proprietary versions of browsers, such as AOL, can interfere with EZproxy. A simple workaround is to connect to your provider, minimize the window, and then open a browser such as Mozilla Firefox or Microsoft Internet Explorer.

K.2.d. Databases - Not all remote access problems are caused by EZproxy. Occasionally databases will have technical problems. Deleting cookies might help. You may successfully pass through EZproxy only to find an error caused by the database. If this happens, back out of the database and try using another one. It is unlikely that both providers would be having technical problems at the same time.

K.2.e. Help and Tips - For assistance, contact the USAWC Research Librarians by phoning (717) 245-3660, or email AskRoot@usawc.libanswers.com

K.2.f. Blackboard Access – All syllabi and digitally available media will be made available on Blackboard.com at the following link: https://proedchallenge.blackboard.com/webapps/login/?action=relogin. For assistance with Blackboard access issues, please contact Mr. Christopher Smart at Christopher.a.smart.civ@mail.mil, or 245-4874.
# APPENDIX VII

## PROGRAM LEARNING OUTCOMES – CURRICULUM MAP

### SSL REP TWS Lesson Crosswalk with PLO's, AY18

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Learning Outcomes</th>
<th>PLO 1: Evaluate theories of war and strategy in the context of national security decisionmaking.</th>
<th>PLO 2: Analyze, adapt, and develop military processes, organizations, and capabilities to achieve national defense objectives.</th>
<th>PLO 3: Employ strategic and operational art to develop strategies and plans that employ the military instrument of power in pursuit of national aims.</th>
<th>PLO 4: Evaluate the nature, concepts, and components of strategic leadership and synthesize their responsible application.</th>
<th>PLO 5: Think critically and creatively in addressing national security issues at the strategic level.</th>
<th>PLO 6: Communicate clearly, persuasively, and candidly.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TWS-1-S</td>
<td>THEORY, WAR, AND STRATEGY</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>TWS-2-S</td>
<td>THUCYDIDES I: THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>TWS-3-S</td>
<td>THUCYDIDES II: WAGING THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR</td>
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<tr>
<td>TWS-4-S</td>
<td>THUCYDIDES III: VICTORY AND DEFEAT</td>
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<tr>
<td>TWS-5-S</td>
<td>INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES AND GEOPOLITICS</td>
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<td>TWS-6-S</td>
<td>WHAT IS WAR? CLAUSEWITZ</td>
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<tr>
<td>TWS-7-S</td>
<td>THE CAUSES OF WAR AND THE CONDITIONS OF PEACE</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>TWS-8-S</td>
<td>MILITARY POWER, THE USE OF FORCE, AND STRATEGIC CONSTRAINTS</td>
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<td>TWS-9-S</td>
<td>ANCIENT MASTERS – SUN Tzu AND KALUTLYA</td>
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<td>TWS-10-S</td>
<td>THEORIES OF LANDPOWER</td>
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<td>TWS-11-S</td>
<td>THEORIES OF SEAPOWER</td>
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<td>TWS-12-S</td>
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<td>TWS-13-S</td>
<td>NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND LIMITED WAR</td>
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<td>TWS-14-S</td>
<td>WAR AMONG THEPEOPLE: PEOPLE’S WAR, INSURGENCY, CON. AND TERRORISM</td>
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<td>TWS-15-S</td>
<td>VICTORY AND CONFLICT TERMINATION</td>
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<td>TWS-16-S</td>
<td>CONTINuity AND CHANGE: THE FUTURE CHARACTER OF WAR AND STRATEGY</td>
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| TWS Totals | 15 | 3 | 18 | 4 | 18 | 18 |
## SSL REP TWS Lesson Crosswalk with JLA’s, AY18

### Joint Learning Areas and Objectives – Curriculum Map

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Learning Area/Objective (L/A/O)</th>
<th>JLA 1: National Strategies</th>
<th>JLA 2: Joint Warfare</th>
<th>JLA 3: National and Joint Planning Systems/Processes</th>
<th>JLA 4: Command, Control, Coordination</th>
<th>JLA 5: Strategic Leadership/Profession of Arms</th>
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<td>TWS-14-S War Among the Peoples: People’s War, Insurgency, CoI, and Terrorism</td>
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<td>TWS-16-S Continuity and Change: The Future Character of War and Strategy</td>
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**TWS Totals:** 16 16 16 16 3 3 5 7 10 16 3 1 2